基于演化博弈的区域港口一体化策略选择及仿真  

Strategy selection and simulation of regional port integration based on evolutionary game theory

作　　者：郑俊 钟铭 张伟航 张志华 郭威佑 ZHENG Jun;ZHONG Ming;ZHANG Weihang;ZHANG Zhihua;GUO Weiyou(College of Transportation Engineering,Dalian Maritime University,Dalian 116026,China;Liaoning Transportation Affairs Service Center,Shenyang 110000,China)

机构地区：[1]大连海事大学交通运输工程学院,辽宁大连116026 [2]辽宁省交通运输事务服务中心,辽宁沈阳110000

出　　处：《中国航海》2023年第3期80-90,共11页Navigation of China

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目(13&ZD170)。

摘　　要：为探索区域港口一体化过程中各港口企业的合作关系,促进各主体在一体化进程中健康、稳定、有序的发展,从区域各港口管理者及经济腹地区域的政府主管部门视角出发,分析政府与区域港口群间的竞合博弈关系,并运用MATLAB软件进行动态仿真。研究表明在政府部门监管行为下的三方博弈模型中,分配系数和政府政策奖惩机制力度是影响区域港口一体化、确保政府监管落到实处的重要因素,最终可实现(1,1,1)和(1,1,0)这两种较为理想的稳定策略,为管理者提供建议参考。Disordered competition among sea ports has been jeopardizing the efforts to gain due economic advantage from their resource advantage.The hinterland regional government can be the driving force to solve the problem.This paper studies the way of improving economic benefits of ports through regional port integration.The cooperation-competition game between regional government and the ports in the process of port integration is analyzed from the angles of both port managements and the regional government.How to achieve healthy and steady development of the port cluster through the unification of port operation is explored.The game among three involved parties in the integration process is simulated with MATLAB.The simulation shows that the distribution coefficient and the strength of reward-punishment mechanism of government are most significant factors influencing the integration process and the efficiency of governmental regulatory.The stability analysis of the equilibrium points in tripartite game is analyzed and the strategies(1,1,1)and(1,1,0)is suggested for stability.

关 键 词：区域港口群 港口一体化 政府行为 演化博弈 MATLAB 

分 类 号：F552[经济管理—产业经济]