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作 者:彭俞超 马思超[1] 王南萱 郑航行 PENG Yuchao;MA Sichao;WANG Nanxuan;ZHENG Hanghang(School of Finance,Central University of Finance and Economics;School of Finance,Capital University of Economics and Business)
机构地区:[1]中央财经大学金融学院,102206 [2]首都经济贸易大学金融学院,100070
出 处:《经济研究》2023年第8期83-99,共17页Economic Research Journal
基 金:国家自然科学基金面上项目(72273160);国家社科基金重大项目(23ZDA116);教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目(22JZD011);首都经济贸易大学重大培育项目(ZD202202)的资助。
摘 要:完善的现代金融监管体系是我国金融业稳定健康发展的重要保障。本文研究发现,2014年针对买入返售业务的影子银行监管政策(银发[2014]127号)显著地降低了银行杠杆率,并使影子银行活动的风险显性化,抑制了银行破产风险。但监管政策实施后,银行创新出同业投资、同业链条的新模式,继续从事影子银行活动,使期限错配问题加剧,流动性风险提高。这表明,影子银行的业务模式在金融创新和监管政策的博弈过程中不断演变,政策制定具有时间局限性,难以一劳永逸解决未来的所有风险。本文研究的政策含义在于,监管政策应遵循“疏堵结合”的思路,在规范化、透明化影子银行业务的同时,拓展正规信贷业务,保障银行盈利来源,从而提升金融监管的效果,助力实体经济发展。Since 2009,China's regulators have issued a series of measures to address shadow banking activities and have achieved remarkable results.It can be seen that the results do not come from a single policy,but stem from repeated games between financial institutions and regulatory authorities.Therefore,this paper tries to take China's shadow banking regulation as an"anchor"to explore the inherent relationship between the logic of financial regulation and institutional market reflection.The development history of China's shadow banking and regulatory evolution can be divided into three stages:the first stage(2008-2013),governance channel business,curbing the non-standard out of the table of the regulatory stage;the second stage(2014-2016),regulating interbank business and outsourcing investment stage;the third stage(2017-),improving the compliance of shadow banking and the comprehensive regulatory stage.Among the above three stages,the regulatory policies in the"interbank business"stage are relatively focused and specific.The Notice on Regulating Interbank Business of Financial Institutions[2014]No.127,as a shadow banking regulatory measure targeting interbank business,effectively solved the legacy problems after the restriction of channel business in the previous stage,but also led to a new shadow banking business model,reflecting the important feature of the repeated games between the development of China's shadow banking and the evolution of regulation.Therefore,this paper takes the Notice issued in 2014 as an exogenous shock and tests the relationship between shadow banking regulation and bank risk by constructing a DID model using the annual panel data of 178 commercial banks in China from 2010 to 2017.The empirical results show that shadow banking regulatory policies significantly reduce bank insolvency risk.The mechanism analysis finds that Document No.127 enhances transparency in the shadow banking business,significantly reduces bank leverage ratios,and improves risk profiles;at the same time,the policy also en
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