美国《2022年芯片法》与中国的应对  

The CHIPS Act of 2022 and China’s Responses

作　　者：易继明[1] 吴梓茗 Yi Ji-ming;Wu Zi-ming(Law School,Peking University,Beijing 100871)

机构地区：[1]北京大学法学院,北京100871

出　　处：《陕西师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2023年第4期65-78,共14页Journal of Shaanxi Normal University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)

摘　　要：2022年8月9日,美国总统拜登正式签署《2022年芯片法》并开始实施。作为对《2021财年国防授权法案》中芯片激励措施部分的进一步落实,该法共设置了7款规定,大致可以分为产业政策与“毒丸条款”两个部分:前者试图通过巨额财政援助补贴芯片制造企业来重建美国本土的芯片产业链,后者意欲拉拢全球的芯片企业赴美投资,阻遏中国及“其他受关注的国家”在先进芯片技术方面的发展势头。虽然《2022年芯片法》因为种种原因可能无法实现预期目标,但其的确对中国芯片产业发展的外部环境造成不利的影响。为此,中国应当从外交、产业以及知识产权3方面入手,积极应对,为中国芯片产业的突围开辟局面。On August 9,2022,the U.S President Joe Biden signed the Chip Act of 2022 into law and began its implementation.As the further implementation of the semiconductor incentives of National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 2021,the law has set seven provisions which can be divided into two parts:industrial policies and“poison pill clause”.The former tries to rebuild America’s chip industry chain by providing financial assistance to chip manufacturers,while the latter wants to invite global chip enterprises to invest in the U.S.and deter the momentum of advanced chip technology of China and any other foreign country of concern.Although the Chip Act of 2022 may not achieve the expected goals for various reasons,it does have an adverse impact on the external environment for the development of China’s chip industry.Therefore,we should start with different policies of diplomacy,industry and intellectual property to create opportunities for China’s chip industry.

关 键 词：《2022年芯片法》 数字经济 产业政策 毒丸条款 

分 类 号：D712.399[政治法律—政治学]