重大工程多主体协同合作利益分配及创新激励机制研究  

Study on Surplus Division and Innovation Incentives of Multi-agent Cooperation in Megaprojects

作　　者：刘娜娜 周国华[1] LIU Nana;ZHOU Guohua(School of Economics and Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu,Sichuan 610031,China)

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2023年第4期148-155,共8页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重大专项(71942006);四川省科学技术厅资助项目(2021ZYD0100)。

摘　　要：针对重大工程供应链中多主体协同合作利益分配以及创新决策问题,考虑到两阶段博弈中决策的不同情形,应用非合作-合作混合的双体博弈方法进行了研究。通过模型构建与求解得到各主体的最优创新努力、收益以及整个系统的最优收益,并在此基础上拓展模型,分析成本补贴和垂直整合两种激励机制对各主体最优创新努力、收益和供应链系统收益的影响。研究发现:重大工程多主体协同合作中存在创新投入不足的情况,导致供应链系统收益偏低;创新成本补贴机制以及垂直整合机制能够有效激励参与主体的创新积极性;成本补贴机制能够提高各主体以及整个供应链系统的收益,垂直整合机制对收益的影响主要取决于整合成本的区间范围。A biform-game approach was used to analyze the surplus division and innovation incentives of multi-agent cooperation in megaprojects,considering the different situations of decision-making in two-stage game.The optimal innovation effort and benefits of each player and the overall system optimal benefits were calculated,and then the model was expanded to analyze the impact of the cost subsidy mechanism and the vertical integration mechanism on the efforts and benefits of each player's optimal innovation effort and the benefits of the supply chain system.The result shows that there are inefficiently low innovation effort incentives in the multi-agent collaboration of megaprojects.The overall surplus of the supply chain is below the efficient surplus.The innovation cost subsidy mechanism and the vertical integration mechanism can effectively stimulate the innovation enthusiasm of the participating entities.The cost subsidy mechanism can improve the revenue of each agent and the whole engineering supply chain.The impact of the vertical integration mechanism on the revenue mainly depends on the range of integration cost.

关 键 词：协同合作 重大工程 利益分配 创新激励 双体博弈 

分 类 号：F284[经济管理—国民经济]