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作 者:莫思敏 丁瑞 王文利[1] 曾建潮[2] MO Simin;DING Rui;WANG Wenli;ZENG Jianchao(School of Economics&Management,Taiyuan University of Science&Technology,Taiyuan,Shanxi 030024,China;School of Computer&Control Engineering,North University of China,Taiyuan,Shanxi 030051,China)
机构地区:[1]太原科技大学经济与管理学院,山西太原030024 [2]中北大学计算机与控制工程学院,山西太原030051
出 处:《工业工程与管理》2023年第4期187-194,共8页Industrial Engineering and Management
基 金:国家自然基金项目(72171162;72071183);山西省重点研发计划项目(201703D111011);山西省高等学校人文社会科学重点研究基地项目(20200129)。
摘 要:生产商生产的装备产品整机和整机中由供应商提供的部件,两者保修区间不一致的问题,给生产商带来较高的维保费用,同时影响客户的使用。为了解决此问题,本文通过分析部件与整机两者保修区间不一致的几种情形,并考虑供应商的保修欺诈行为,在生产商与供应商之间制定了合适的部件外包保修服务策略。该策略以生产商的利润最大和供应商的效用最大为目标,通过求解双方的纳什均衡博弈模型,得到供应商的最优欺诈决策和生产商的最优检查决策。最后,通过理论分析和敏感性分析,讨论外包保修策略中的罚款和佣金率对最优解以及双方利润和效用的影响。The warranty intervals between the whole machine and its components manufactured by the suppliers are different.The problem causes expensive warranty cost for the manufacturers and impacts on consumer.In order to solve this problem,an optimal outsourcing warranty strategy of components between the manufacturers and the suppliers was established.In this strategy,several situations involved in different warranty intervals between the whole machine and components were analyzed as well as the fraud of the supplier was considered.Furthermore,the supplier's optimal fraud decision and the manufacturer's optimal inspection decision were obtained through solving the mixed Nash equilibrium strategy with maximizing goal of the profit of manufacturers and the utility of suppliers.Finally,the impacts of fine and commission rate in the outsourcing warranty strategy on the optimal solution as well as profit and utility of both parties were discussed.
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