绿色零售商公平关切下供应链协调机制研究  

A Study of Supply Chain Coordination Mechanisms under the Fairness Concern of Green Retailers

作　　者：曾倩琳[1] 梁娟[1] ZENG Qian-lin;LIANG Juan(College of Business and Administration,Fujian Jiangxia University,Fuzhou,350108,China)

机构地区：[1]福建江夏学院工商管理学院,福建福州350108

出　　处：《福建江夏学院学报》2023年第4期1-14,44,共15页Journal of Fujian Jiangxia University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目“多层次创新网络对科技服务业集群企业创新绩效的影响研究”(71902034);福建江夏学院科研创新团队“现代服务业管理与创新团队”资助项目。

摘　　要：构建绿色零售商在公平关切下四种竞合模型,分析其在制造商、绿色零售商和传统零售商构成的供应链之间的均衡影响。结果表明:在分散模型中,制造商的利润与绿色零售商的公平关切程度正相关,而绿色零售商和传统零售商的利润皆与之负相关;而在制造商与传统零售商联盟模型中,联盟利润与之负相关,绿色零售商的利润与之正相关。另外,比较Shapley值、τ值以及Nash法三种利润分配方案,发现较之Shapley值法,τ值法和Nash谈判法符合个体理性和集体理性,解皆在核内,两种协调机制在解决绿色供应链成员合作下的利润公平分配问题时更加合理,利于实现绿色供应链利益协调。Four competing and cooperative models of green retailers under fairness concerns are constructed to analyze their equilibrium impacts among manufacturers,green retailers and traditional retailers in the supply chain.The results show that:in the decentralized model,manufacturers'profits are positively correlated with the degree of fairness concerns of green retailers,while the profits of both green and traditional retailers are negatively correlated with them;in the manufacturer-traditional retailer alliance model,alliance profits are negatively correlated while and green retailer profits are positively correlated.In addition,comparing the three profit distribution schemes of Shapley value,τvalue and Nash method,it is found that compared with the Shapley value,τvalue and Nash negotiation method are in line with individual rationality and collective rationality,and the solution is in the core;the two coordination mechanisms are more reasonable in solving the problem of fair distribution of profits under the cooperation of the members of the green supply chain,which is conducive to realizing the coordination of the interests of the green supply chain.

关 键 词：绿色供应链 公平关切 协调机制 利润分配 

分 类 号：F253[经济管理—国民经济]