基于不完全信息博弈的网络攻防策略分析  

Analysis of Network Attack and Defense Strategies Based on Incomplete Information Game

作　　者：郑合锋 陈四军 ZHENG Hefeng;CHEN Sijun(The Big Data Institute,Qingdao Yellow Sea College,Qingdao 266427,China;Unit 31106 of PLA,Nanjing 210016,China)

机构地区：[1]青岛黄海学院大数据学院,山东青岛266427 [2]解放军31106部队,南京210016

出　　处：《火力与指挥控制》2023年第8期67-73,80,共8页Fire Control & Command Control

摘　　要：为了分析信息安全中网络攻防双方对抗行动最优策略的选取,构建了基于不完全信息博弈的网络攻防模型,给出了该模型纳什均衡的求解方法。该模型及方法着眼于攻防双方行动的相互影响和对抗过程的动态变化,通过对攻防博弈中选取不同策略的不同收益进行计算,分析攻防双方最优策略的选取。最后还通过仿真实验对模型进行检验,结果表明,该模型符合网络攻防实际,且简单可行。To analyze optimal strategy selection of network attack and defense confrontational actions in information security,a network attack and defense model based on incomplete information game is established,the solution method of the game Nash equilibrium is given.The model and method focus on the mutual effects of the actions of both attackers and defenders and dynamic change of confrontation process,the different benefits of selecting different strategies from attack and defense game is calculated,the selection of optimal strategy of attacker and defender is analyzed.Finally,the simulation experiments test this model,the results show the model is in line with the reality of network attack and defense,it is simple and feasible.

关 键 词：网络信息安全 博弈论 网络攻防 模型 

分 类 号：TP391[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]