基于多代理人竞争的连续时间风险投资激励机制研究  

Incentive Mechanism of Venture Capital Under Continuous Time of Multi-Agent Competition

作　　者：李大海 丁涛[3] 梁樑[2,4] 杨敏 胡婉婷 LI Dahai;DING Tao;LIANG Liang;YANG Min;HU Wanting(School of Big Data and Statistics,Anhui University,Hefei 230601;School of Management,Hefei University of Technology,Hefei 230009;School of Economics,Hefei University of Technology,Hefei 230601;Key Laboratory of Process Optimization and Intelligent Decision-Making,Ministry of Education,Hefei 230009)

机构地区：[1]安徽大学大数据与统计学院,合肥230601 [2]合肥工业大学管理学院,合肥230009 [3]合肥工业大学经济学院,合肥230601 [4]过程优化与智能决策教育部重点实验室,合肥230009

出　　处：《系统科学与数学》2023年第9期2232-2251,共20页Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金委基础科学中心项目(72188101);国家自然科学基金面上项目(72271080,71971074);安徽省科研编制计划项目(2022AH050104,2022AH050035)资助课题。

摘　　要：初创企业的联合创始人以技术,管理等能力入股,分别承担不同的任务,并为投资人负责.基于此文章构建了中立与竞争两种关系下异质双代理人模型,并通过比较静态分析重点研究竞争对最优合同的影响.研究表明:首先,竞争促进了企业家的努力,并减少了投资家的激励成本,但无法持续增加投资家的收益.其次,竞争能够在一定程度上加速资本退出并提高资本退出收益,但这两个目标往往无法同时实现.因此,投资人需要以牺牲部分资本退出收益为代价换取快速退出,从而给出了“IPO抑价”问题的一个解释.最后,异质性代理人之间的最优竞争关系是不公平的.文章研究结果为防范过度竞争,优化竞争机制提供了理论依据.The co-founder of the start-up takes the shares in the form of technical and management skills,undertakes different tasks and is responsible for the investors.Based on this,this paper constructs a heterogeneous dual agent model with neutral and competitive relations,and focuses on the infuence of competition on the optimal contract through comparative static analysis.Our study first shows that competition promotes the efforts of entrepreneurs and reduces the incentive costs of investors,but it cannot continuously increase the returns of investors.Second,competition can accelerate capital exit and increase capital exit returns to a certain extent,but these two goals can not be achieved at the same time.Therefore,investors tend to sacrifice part of the capital exit return at the cost of a quick exit,which gives an explanation of the IPO underpricing problem.Finally,the optimal competition between heterogeneous agents is unfair.The results of this study provide a theoretical basis for preventing excessive competition and standardizing competition system.

关 键 词：竞争 动态激励 多代理人 风险投资 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学]