董事会监督、债务水平与债务融资成本——来自审计委员会履职披露的证据  

Board Supervision,Debt Level and Cost of Debt Financing:Evidence from Audit Committee Performance Disclosure

作　　者：甄玉晗 章之旺[2] 赵磊 ZHEN Yuhan;ZHANG Zhiwang;ZHAO Lei(Chinese Academy of Fiscal Sciences,Beijing 100142,China;School of Accounting,Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing 211815,China)

机构地区：[1]中国财政科学研究院,北京100142 [2]南京审计大学会计学院,江苏南京211815

出　　处：《南京审计大学学报》2023年第5期31-40,共10页Journal of Nanjing Audit University

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目(20YJA790023)。

摘　　要：选取2013年上交所要求单独披露审计委员会履职信息这一外生事件作为董事会监督增强的替代变量,实证检验董事会监督对债务融资成本的影响及其作用机制。研究显示,董事会监督与债务融资成本负相关,在区分债务水平后,这一负向影响仅存在于债务水平低的公司,而在债务水平高的公司,董事会监督会增加债务融资成本。作用机制检验发现,低债务水平公司的董事会监督主要发挥“信息质量”作用,而高债务水平公司的董事会监督主要发挥“风险承担”作用。截面检验发现,董事会监督的正向影响在管理层权力大的样本更显著,其负向影响则在信息不确定性高的样本更显著。研究加深了对董事会监督所带来的成本与收益的理解,同时对完善我国董事会监督机制也有一定启发。This paper exploits the quasi-natural experiment of the Shanghai Stock Exchange disclosure requirements for audit committee performance in 2013,as a proxy variable for the enhancement of board supervision,and examine the impact of board supervision on debt financing costs and its mechanisms.This study shows that board supervision reduces the cost of debt financing.After distinguishing the level of corporate debt,it is found that board oversight reduces the cost of debt financing for under-leveraged firms,while board oversight increased the cost of debt financing for over-leveraged firms.The mechanism test results show that board supervision mainly plays the role of “information quality” in under-leveraged firms,while board supervision mainly plays the role of “risk taking” in over-leveraged firms.The cross-sectional test results show that the positive impact of board supervision is more significant in companies with high management power,while the negative impact is more significant in companies with high information uncertainty.This research deepens the understanding of the costs and benefits brought by board supervision,and also provides some inspiration for improving the board supervision mechanism in China.

关 键 词：董事会监督 债务水平 风险承担 信息质量 债务融资成本 审计委员会 履职披露 内部控制 

分 类 号：F239[经济管理—会计学] F275[经济管理—国民经济]