控股股东股权质押与非金融企业影子银行化——来自我国A股市场的经验证据  

Controlling Shareholders'Share Pledging and the Shadow Banking of Real Enterprises:Evidence from Chinese A-share Market

作　　者：庄俊明 刘霞[2] 苏皑 ZHUANG Jun-ming;LIU Xia;SU Ai(School of Management,Guangdong University of Science and Technology,Dongguan Guangdong 523083,China;School of Business,Nanjing University,Nanjing Jiangsu 210093,China;School of Public Administration,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou Guangdong 510641,China)

机构地区：[1]广东科技学院管理学院,广东东莞523083 [2]南京大学商学院,江苏南京210093 [3]华南理工大学公共管理学院,广东广州510641

出　　处：《技术经济与管理研究》2023年第10期65-70,共6页Journal of Technical Economics & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71972098)。

摘　　要：选取2008—2021年中国A股上市企业样本数据,实证检验了控股股东股权质押对非金融企业影子银行化的影响。研究发现,出于维护控制权利益和规避追加保证金压力的动机,控股股东股权质押降低了非金融企业影子银行化水平。进一步研究发现,股价下行压力的增加和分析师关注度的提高均会强化控股股东股权质押与非金融企业影子银行化的负向关系。以上主要结论在通过倾向得分匹配法、两阶段最小二乘法和控制个体固定效应等方法检验后仍显著成立。Using the sample of real listed enterprises in China from 2008 to 2021,this paper empirically tests the impact of contro-lling shareholders'share pledging on shadow banking of non-financial enterprises.The main findings show that,to protect the interests of control and avoid margin call pressure,controlling shareholders'share pledging is negatively associated with the level of shadow banking investment.Further studies show that the increase of downward pressure on share prices or analyst coverage will strengthen the negative relationship between controlling shareholder's share pledging and shadow banking investment.The above main conclusions are significantly valid after endogeneity tests such as propensity score matching method,two-stage least square method and firm-fixed effect.

关 键 词：控股股东 股权质押 控制权 影子银行化 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学]