基于动态博弈理论的污水处理厂PPP项目风险分担研究  被引量:2

Research on risk sharing of wastewater treatment plant PPP projects based on dynamic game theory

在线阅读下载全文

作  者:刘清连 荀志远 常海旭 马菱 邱现乐 LIU Qinglian;XUN Zhiyuan;CHANG Haixu;MA Ling;QIU Xianle(School of Management Engineering,Qingdao University of Technology,Qingdao 266525,China)

机构地区:[1]青岛理工大学管理工程学院,青岛266525

出  处:《青岛理工大学学报》2023年第5期87-96,共10页Journal of Qingdao University of Technology

基  金:山东省社会科学规划研究专项项目(20CSDJ18)。

摘  要:污水处理厂PPP项目的复杂性和多参与方使得该类项目存在众多风险,分析项目实施过程中存在的风险并进行合理分担是保证项目顺利实施的重要一环。基于动态博弈理论分析了模型涉及的风险相关参数,提出了一种考虑信息犹豫度的确定参数权重方法,建立了政府部门和社会资本方的三回合风险再分担动态博弈模型,得出了双方的风险分担比例。以某污水处理厂PPP项目为实例进行算例分析,结果表明,政府部门和社会资本方的风险承担份额与谈判成本的大小、公私双方地位不平等、信息不对称等因素具有关联;谈判成本增大,社会资本方承担的风险会加大,政府部门占据的主导地位越高,向社会资本方转移的风险份额越大,研究结果对类似项目顺利实施具有指导意义。The complexity and multiple participants of wastewater treatment plant PPP projects bring to such projects many risks,and analyzing the risks in the project implementation process and sharing them reasonably are an important part to ensure the smooth implementation of the project.Based on the dynamic game theory,this study analyzes the risk-related parameters and proposes a method to determine the parameter weights,considering the information hesitation.Then,it establishes a three-round dynamic game model of risk re-sharing between government departments and social capital parties,and derives the risk-sharing ratio of both parties.A wastewater treatment plant PPP project is used as an example for calculation analysis,and the results show that the risk sharing between government departments and social capital parties is related to the size of negotiation costs,unequal status of public and private parties,information asymmetry,etc.;the higher the negotiation costs are,the greater the risk borne by social capital parties is;the higher the dominant position of government departments is,the greater the risk share transferred to social capital parties is.The results of this study are instructively meaningful to the smooth implementation of simi lar projects.

关 键 词:污水处理厂 PPP项目 动态博弈理论 风险分担 犹豫度 

分 类 号:F280[经济管理—国民经济]

 

参考文献:

正在载入数据...

 

二级参考文献:

正在载入数据...

 

耦合文献:

正在载入数据...

 

引证文献:

正在载入数据...

 

二级引证文献:

正在载入数据...

 

同被引文献:

正在载入数据...

 

相关期刊文献:

正在载入数据...

相关的主题
相关的作者对象
相关的机构对象