治理逻辑、权力结构与监督制度绩效  

State Governance Logic,Power Structure,and the Performance of the Supervision System

作　　者：皇甫鑫[1] 李立[1] Huangfu Xin;Li Li(Research Center for Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,Zhejiang University,Hangzhou;Institute of China Rural Studies,Central China Normal University,Wuhan)

机构地区：[1]浙江大学中国特色社会主义研究中心

出　　处：《经济社会体制比较》2023年第5期97-106,共10页Comparative Economic & Social Systems

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目“新时代党和国家监督体系的理论建设与制度完善研究”(项目编号:22ZDA039)。

摘　　要：在当代中国,权力监督内嵌于国家治理,监督制度的绩效水平受国家治理逻辑与权力结构调整的影响。在效率逻辑占主导的治理情境中,地方层面的监督权常被统合,形成统合型功能性分权。统合型功能性分权具有统筹功能,致力于保障效率;同时监督独立性不强易于导致腐败高发和制度秩序的不稳定、不确定。随着约束逻辑重要性的上升,监督权的专责性、独立性和权威性也会随之提升,形成专责型功能性分权。专责型功能性分权可以较好地保障权力的规范运行,却常常以损失部分效率为代价。国家治理有效性的关键在于通过构建不同的权力结构形态平衡效率与约束的双重目标。In contemporary China,the supervision system is an integral part of state governance,and its performance is influenced by the evolving logic of state governance.Within the efficiency logic,local-level supervision power tends to be integrated,resulting in an Integrated Functional Separation of Power.This integrated approach facilitates overall planning and ensures efficiency growth.However,the lack of independence in supervision leads to a higher incidence of corruption and instability,causing uncertainty in institutional order.As the constraint logic gains prominence,there is an increasing focus on enhancing the specialization,independence,and authority of the supervision power.This gives rise to a Dedicated Functional Separation of Power,which ensures the standardized operation of power but may sacrifice some efficiency.The effectiveness of state governance depends on striking a balance between efficiency and constraint by constructing different forms of power structures.

关 键 词：权力监督 国家治理 制度绩效 效率 约束 

分 类 号：D262.6[政治法律—政治学]