从纯粹行为到他心并现:一项同感现象学考察  

From Mere Behavior to Co-Presence of Other Minds:An Inquiry on the Phenomenology of Empathy

作　　者：陈巍 Chen Wei

机构地区：[1]绍兴文理学院心理学系 [2]浙江大学现象学与心性思想研究中心

出　　处：《中国社会科学院大学学报》2023年第9期35-50,137,共17页Journal of University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“他心直接感知的神经哲学进路研究”(21BZX005)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：他心问题的笛卡尔式怀疑经由密尔的论证变得愈发顽固,由此造成了不可见的心灵与可见的行为之间的鸿沟。当我们观察他人时,我们看到的不是他人的心理生活,而是一种“纯粹行为”。因此,我们相信不可见的他心之存在必须建立在对可见行为证据的推理基础上。通过梳理胡塞尔与施泰因的同感现象学线索,结合来自心灵哲学、认知科学与神经科学的前沿论据,本文尝试为史密斯提出的他心并现论做一种自然化的辩护:具身性决定了纯粹行为在概念上的不融贯性,而假装行为作为一种表达统一体是不完整的。The Cartesian skepticism surrounding the problem of other minds is exacerbated by Mill's arguments,creating a divide between invisible mental states and visible behavior.When we observe another person,we only perceive their outward actions,not their internal mental experiences,leading to a perception of"mere behavior".Consequently,our belief in the existence of another person's invisible mind must be deduced from evidence of their observable behavior.By combining insights from Husserl and Stein's works on the phenomenology of empathy with perspectives from philosophy of mind,cognitive science,and neuroscience,this paper aims to provide a naturalistic defense of Smith's theory of the co-presence of other minds.It argues that embodiment renders the notion of"mere behavior"conceptually incoherent,highlighting that pretended action is incomplete as an expression of unity.

关 键 词：他心问题 现象学 推理 并现论 具身性 

分 类 号：B15[哲学宗教—世界哲学]