松散型医联体模式下医患行为的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Doctor-patient Behavior Under Loose Medical Alliance Model

作　　者：郑津津 柳俊杰 马雷 ZHENG Jin-jin;LIU Jun-jie;MA Lei(Library and Information Office,Tianjin Medical University Cancer Hospital,Tianjin 300060,China)

机构地区：[1]天津医科大学肿瘤医院图书情报室,天津300060

出　　处：《医学信息》2023年第20期24-29,共6页Journal of Medical Information

基　　金：天津医科大学2020年度医院管理创新研究项目(编号:2020YG11)。

摘　　要：本文基于医联体中小型医院与患者行为策略选择的影响因素,运用演化博弈的有限理性和动态演化,探讨影响医联体发展的行为主体变化策略,对如何高效改善医疗资源配置问题提出相关对策与建议,旨在提升区域医疗服务体系整体效能,从根本上解决就医难题。Based on the influencing factors of the behavior strategy selection of small and medium-sized hospitals and patients in the medical consortium,this paper uses the bounded rationality and dynamic evolution of evolutionary game to explore the behavior subject change strategy that affects the development of the medical consortium,and puts forward relevant countermeasures and suggestions on how to effectively improve the allocation of medical resources,aiming to improve the overall efficiency of the regional medical service system and fundamentally solve the problem of medical treatment.

关 键 词：松散型医联体 医患关系 卫生经济管理 演化博弈 

分 类 号：R197[医药卫生—卫生事业管理]