论科恩对自我所有论的批判  

On Cohen's Criticism of Self Ownership

作　　者：覃颖琪 Qin Yingqi

机构地区：[1]武汉大学哲学学院

出　　处：《马克思主义哲学研究》2023年第1期278-286,共9页Marxist Philosophical Research

摘　　要：科恩在《自我所有、自由和平等》一书中反驳了诺齐克以自我所有权来为自由至上主义作辩护的观点。科恩指出,诺齐克为了给自我所有权赋予更多的权威和吸引力,将奴隶制、自主权、“人是目的”原则与自我所有权的论证混为一谈。不过,科恩的反驳并不彻底,其具体论证有待完善。他用量与质的区别来类比自我所有权和奴隶制的方法并不成功,他区分自我所有权与自主权、人作为目的的理由也不充分。In Self-Ownership,Freedom,and Equality,Cohen refutes Nozick's use of self-ownership to justify liberal supremacy.Cohen points out that Nozick conflates slavery,autonomy,and the"man is an end"principle with the argument for self-ownership in order to give more authority and appeal to self-ownership.Cohen's rebuttal is not complete,and there is room for further refinement in the specific arguments of the rebuttal.His analogy between self-ownership and slavery in terms of a qualitative distinction is not successful,nor is his justification for distinguishing between self-ownership and autonomy,and the person as an end in itself.

关 键 词：科恩 诺齐克 自我所有论 

分 类 号：B03[哲学宗教—哲学理论]