平台与信托合作下的数据安全演化博弈研究  

Research on the Evolutionary Game of Data Security with the Platform-trust Cooperation

作　　者：邓可 DENG Ke(School of Economics and Management,Shanghai University of Political Science and Law Shanghai 201701)

机构地区：[1]上海政法学院经济管理学院,上海201701

出　　处：《中国商论》2023年第20期99-102,共4页China Journal of Commerce

基　　金：2022年度全国教育科学规划课题“企业技能教育管理体制研究”(BKA220030)。

摘　　要：本文针对平台数据安全日益突出的问题,探讨平台与信托机构合作能否演化成为可行的多方治理方案,基于平台和信托的行为策略构建演化博弈模型,得到演化博弈的均衡解;利用比较静态分析探究博弈稳定状态的影响因素。研究发现,政府税收优惠和补贴、政府罚款、投资收益率、收入让渡比例与安全高标准的演化博弈结果正相关;投资分担比例、平台溢出系数与安全高标准的演化博弈结果负相关;依托数据信托更有利于政府发挥监管职能和平台履行数据安全责任。In terms of the increasingly prominent problem of platform data security and exploring whether the cooperation between platforms and trusts can evolve into a feasible multi-party governance scheme,this paper constructs an evolutionary game model based on the behavioral strategies of platforms and trusts,obtains the equilibrium solution of the evolutionary game and explores the influencing factors of the stable state of the game using comparative static analysis.It is found that government tax incentives and subsidies,government fines,investment returns,and the proportion of revenue alienation are positively correlated with the results of the evolutionary game of high-security standards;the proportion of investment sharing and the platform spillover coefficient are negatively correlated with the results of the evolutionary game of high-security standards;and relying on the data trust is more conducive to the government’s regulatory function and the platform’s fulfillment of its data security responsibilities.

关 键 词：平台 数据信托 数据安全 演化博弈 比较静态分析 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]