捍卫认知自由  

Defending Doxastic Freedom

作　　者：舒卓 Shu Zhuo(School of Marxism,Zhejiang University of Technology,Hangzhou,310023)

机构地区：[1]浙江工业大学马克思主义学院

出　　处：《哲学评论》2022年第2期18-30,共13页Wuda Philosophical Review

基　　金：教育部人文社科青年基金“哲学视域下的证据本性问题研究”(18YJC720018)。

摘　　要：我们可以自己决定去相信什么,也因此需要为这些信念负责。但是,信念又总是受证据左右。证据指向什么,我们就会相信什么。当我们置证据于不顾时,却又会陷入各种偏见而不可自拔。在何种意义上,我们有相信的自由呢?相容论是目前最有说服力的自由理论,如果一个信念是对理由的恰当响应,那么它就是自由的。然而,有批评指出,如果这里的理由仅限于证据性的认知理由,那么还不足以保证自由。在信念之外,另有一种独特的认知状态,即悬置判断。它可以响应各种理由,而不限于认知理由。由此,认知自由或许不是主动相信什么的自由,而是不去相信、拒绝相信的自由,可以称之为“否定性的认知自由”。We need to responsible for much of our beliefs,for we decide to believe them.But beliefs are determined by evidence.We will believe whatever evidence sufficiently supports.When we disregard evidence,biases catch us.Do we really have the freedom to believe?Compatibilism gives us the most promising positive answer.Roughly,a belief is free when it rightly responded to reason.However,if the reason here means only epistemic reason,then there is no free at all.Besides belief,there’s another doxastic attitude:Suspension of Judgment.I will argue that Suspension can respond to all kinds of reason,include epistemic reason.So,we have the freedom to Suspend Judging.In this way,so-called Negative Doxastic Freedom is defended here.

关 键 词：悬置判断 相容论 认知自由 认知责任 自由意志 

分 类 号：B017[哲学宗教—哲学理论]