全民所有矿产资源资产损害发现机制的优化——以内蒙古锡林郭勒盟为研究样本  

Optimization of Damage Detection Mechanism of Mineral Resources Assets Owned by the Whole People -A Case Study of Xilingol League in Inner Mongolia

作　　者：曹宇[1] 祁瑞祥 茶娜[2] CAO Yu;QI Ruixiang;CHA Na(Inner Mongolia University Law School,Hohhot 010070,China;School of Economics and Management,Inner Mongolia University,Hohhot 010070,China)

机构地区：[1]内蒙古大学法学院,呼和浩特010070 [2]内蒙古大学经济管理学院,呼和浩特010070

出　　处：《中国国土资源经济》2023年第10期28-34,58,共8页Natural Resource Economics of China

基　　金：司法部项目“自然保护区矿业权退出法律制度研究”(22SFB5045);内蒙古自治区高等学校人文社会科学重点研究项目“内蒙古矿区生态修复法律制度研究”(NJSZ23033)。

摘　　要：在全民所有自然资源资产委托代理改革背景下,优化全民所有矿产资源资产损害发现机制势在必行。文章分析了内蒙古锡林郭勒盟试点地区的公开司法数据,总结了工作中存在的问题,通过借鉴较为成熟的生态环境损害发现机制,探索优化全民所有矿产资源资产损害发现机制的可能路径:(1)在内部架构层面,可以深化与技术支撑的融合,实现工作方式的智能化;(2)在外部衔接层面,应强化多元支撑,促进部门合作的协同化;(3)在有效补充层面,要完善激励保护措施,保证监督力量的社会化。Under the background of the principle-agent reform of national-owned natural resources assets,it is imperative to optimize the damage detection mechanism of mineral resources assets owned by the whole people.This paper analyzes the open judicial data of the pilot areas of Xilingol League in Inner Mongolia,it summarizes the problems existing in the work.By referring to the more mature eco-environmental damage detection mechanism,this paper explores the possible path to optimize the damage detection mechanism of mineral resources assets owned by the whole people:①at the level of internal structure,deepen the integration with technical support to realize the intelligent working mode;②at the level of external interface,strengthen diversified support and promote the coordination of departmental cooperation;③at the level of effective supplement,improve incentive and protection measures and ensure the socialization of supervision forcess.

关 键 词：自然资源资产 矿产资源资产 委托代理机制 损害赔偿 

分 类 号：D912.6[政治法律—环境与资源保护法学] F407.1[政治法律—法学] F062.1[经济管理—产业经济]