马克思“实践本体论”的困境与出路——对虚假问题意识的消解  

The dilemma and way out of marx's"practical ontology"--Dispelling the illusion of misleading issues

作　　者：王晓蕾 WANG Xiaolei(School of Marxism,Zhejiang Normal University,Jinhua 321017,China)

机构地区：[1]浙江师范大学马克思主义学院,浙江金华321017

出　　处：《东华大学学报（社会科学版）》2023年第3期39-44,共6页Journal of Donghua University:Social Science

摘　　要：关于马克思主义哲学本体论的定位一直存在争论,一些学者认为应从“物质”角度进行阐释,另一些学者则主张以“实践”作为切入点。两种观点均存在局限性。首先,纯粹地坚守“物质本体论”可能使我们难以区分马克思的唯物主义与传统唯物主义。但如果坚持“实践本体论”,把“实践”当作一种物质性活动则又打破了本身存在于“物质”中的紧密联系的客观性与普遍必然性,导致我们无法解释人类社会历史规律的普遍必然性。此外,“实践本体论”的理解可能将马克思主义哲学局限于人学框架之内。因此,我们应当从“本体论”这一“虚假”问题意识中解脱出来。The positioning of the ontological theory in Marxist philosophy has always been a matter of debate.Some scholars insist on starting from"material",while others advocate approaching from"practice".This article attempts to argue that if we adhere to the"material ontology",we would be unable to distinguish Marx's materialism from old materialism.However,if we adhere to the"practical ontology"and regard"practice"as a material activity,it would break the inherent objective and universal inevitability present within"material".This makes it difficult for us to explain the universal inevitability of the laws of human social history.Moreover,interpreting Marxist philosophy from the perspective of"practical ontology"merely confines it within the framework of human studies.Therefore,we should liberate ourselves from the misleading issue of"ontology".

关 键 词：实践本体论 物质本体论 规律 必然性 

分 类 号：B0-0[哲学宗教—马克思主义哲学]