为权利意志论辩护  

In Defense of the Will Theory of Rights

作　　者：张途 Zhang Tu

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学法学院

出　　处：《环球法律评论》2023年第5期175-190,共16页Global Law Review

摘　　要：权利意志论最常面临的批评是它过于狭窄:其一,如果权利的本质是意志或选择自由,那么就无法容纳不可放弃的权利概念。其二,权利意志论无法解释尚未具备自由意志选择的儿童和无行为能力成年人如何能够拥有权利。但这两大批评都建立在对作为意志论规范基础的“个人自治”的错误预设上,误以为儿童和无行为能力成年人没有权利,而有行为能力的成年人则无论在何种情况下都似乎拥有无限的自我权威。权利是对个人自治的保护,这并不意味着是对个体当下所有实际自治行使的选择、实际追逐的善观念的保护。个人自治不是一个纯描述性概念,而是一个包含了个体对自身目标欲望动机等的反思的道德意义上的规范性概念。更完整的个人自治观承认:儿童和无行为能力成年人虽不能即时实施权利,但不意味着他们不拥有权利的可实施性;权利在本质上是可放弃的,但不等于所有权利均可放弃,至少不可为人奴役之权利无法被作为道德主体的人所放弃。The debate about whether the idea of rights protects will or interest has lasted over a century.The will theory argues that rights essentially protect right-bearers'personal autonomy and freedom of choice,while the interest theory claims that rights are boiled down to safeguarding right-bearers'well-being and interests.The will theory is often criticized by the interest theory on two grounds.On the one hand,the will theory falls short of explaining why children and persons in a comatose state cannot be right-bearers.On the other hand,it cannot explicate the idea of inalienable rights,such as the right to life,the right to liberty,the right not to be enslaved or tortured,and so on.These two criticisms appear to be scattered,yet they pose foundational challenges to the will theory because they touch upon two core features of rights in the will theory,namely enforceability and waivablity.Since only enforceable rights can be regarded as genuine rights,children and persons in a comatose state who are unable to enforce their rights cannot be considered as right-bearers.Similarly,since rights are waivable,the will theory cannot consistently make sense of the concept of inalienable rights.Nevertheless,both criticisms are based on a misplaced presumption of the normative foundation of the will theory,namely personal autonomy.The fact that rights protect personal autonomy does not mean that it merely protects individuals'actual choice or actual pursuit of their conception of the good.Personal autonomy is not simply a descriptive concept,but rather a normative idea as it is intertwined with moral autonomy which involves substantive values of self-governance and selfreflection.It is responsive to either the reasoning of moral agents or objective practical reasons.Therefore,personal autonomy is rather inclusive insofar as it allows individuals to keep their distance from their first-order motivations or even disown those motivations.However,I will not discriminate between personal autonomy responsive to reasoning and personal

关 键 词：意志论 无行为能力人 不可放弃的权利 个人自治 

分 类 号：D923[政治法律—民商法学] D922.16[政治法律—法学]