企业财务杠杆、债务偿还压力与劳动雇用:来自中国的证据  

Leverage,Debt Repayment Pressure and Employment:Evidence from China

作　　者：钱雪松[1,2] 石鑫 Qian Xuesong;Shi Xin

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学经济学院,湖北省武汉市430074 [2]华中科技大学创新发展研究中心,湖北省武汉市430074

出　　处：《世界经济》2023年第9期108-132,共25页The Journal of World Economy

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费(2023WKYXZD018);华中科技大学文科双一流建设项目基金(发展经济学团队);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71872067)的资助。

摘　　要：本文运用双重差分法考察去杠杆政策引致的债务偿还压力如何影响企业劳动雇用。研究结果表明,去杠杆政策实施后,与负债程度较低企业相比,过度负债企业的劳动雇佣规模显著下降,且该效应在短债长用水平较高、成长性较低、国有控股和对外部融资依赖度较高的企业中相对更强。机制分析发现,去杠杆政策引致的债务偿还压力通过加剧流动性约束和债务违约风险抑制了企业劳动雇用。此外,去杠杆政策主要抑制了企业对低技能劳动的雇用,而且有助于降低企业劳动资源错配水平,从而提高劳动配置效率。本文识别出了债务偿还压力影响企业劳动雇用的因果关系,并厘清了其作用机理,对进一步优化企业融资环境以实现防控风险和稳定就业的动态平衡具有重要借鉴意义。This paper uses a difference-in-differences(DID)approach to examine how debt repayment pressure resulting from deleveraging affects employment in firms.The empirical results reveal that after the implementation of the deleveraging policy,labour employment is significantly lower in over-indebted firms than in less indebted firms,and this effect is relatively stronger in firms with higher levels of short-term debt and long-term use,lower growth,those co-owned by the state and with greater dependence on external financing.Analysis of the mechanism shows that an increase in debt repayment pressure resulting from the deleveraging policy dampens corporate employment by exacerbating liquidity constraints and debt default risks.The deleveraging policy also mainly discourages firms from hiring low-skilled labour and helps to reduce the mismatch level of corporate labour resources,thereby improving efficiency in labour allocation.Overall,this study identifies the causal relationship between debt repayment pressure and corporate employment and clarifies its mechanism,which has important implications for further optimising the corporate financing environment to achieve a dynamic balance of risk prevention and employment stabilisation.

关 键 词：去杠杆政策 债务偿还压力 劳动雇用决策 劳动配置效率 

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