河流洪水风险控制的合作博弈分析  

The Cooperative Game Approach for River Flooding Risk

作　　者：单而芳[1] SHAN Er-fang(School of Management,Shanghai University,Shanghai 200444,China)

机构地区：[1]上海大学管理学院,上海200444

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2023年第9期45-51,共7页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(72371151)。

摘　　要：随着社会经济的发展和气候变暖等因素的影响,河流洪水风险控制面临诸多挑战。护土保水是防止洪水风险的重要措施之一。如何激励同一河流沿岸的利益主体,使其自愿改变土地利用方式,以达到护土保水的目的,各利益主体之间的利益分配是非常关键的问题之一。本文以合作博弈理论作为工具,针对同一河流沿岸利益主体的总利益,提出了基于Shapley值的分配方案,由此建立了上、下游利益主体之间的合理补偿机制,以此激励河流上、下游利益主体之间的合作,使上游利益主体注重森林作为天然保水特征所发挥的作用,增强上游的蓄水能力,从而达到洪水风险控制的目标。With the development of social economy and the influence of climate warming and other factors,river flood risk control is still facing many challenges.How to incentivize the agents on a river basin to voluntarily change their land use for soil and water retention?The distribution of benefits among the agents is one of the most critical issues.This is one of the important topic on flood risk prevention,In view of the total benefit among agents on a river basin,an allocation rule based on Shapley value is proposed,which can establish a fair compensation mechanism among the upstream and downstream so as to incentivize the cooperation.The upstream agents should focus on the role played by forests as natural water retention features and enhance upstream water retention in order to attain the goal of flood risk prevention.

关 键 词：合作博弈 洪水风险 SHAPLEY值 补偿 有向图 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]