地方融资平台债务风险传导机制与政策应对  

Mechanism of Debt Risk Transmission of Local Government Financing Platforms and Policy Responses

作　　者：马勇[1,2] 章洪铭 MAYong;ZHANG Hong-ming(School of Finance,Renmin University of China;China Financial Policy Research Center,Renmin University of China)

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学财政金融学院 [2]中国人民大学中国财政金融政策研究中心

出　　处：《中国工业经济》2023年第8期42-60,共19页China Industrial Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“中国建设现代中央银行调控制度研究”(批准号21ZDA044)。

摘　　要：本文基于明斯基理论框架和地方融资平台运行的现实基础,通过构建包含“土地金融”和“庞氏融资”特征的DSGE模型,对地方融资平台债务的形成机理、地方融资平台的违约风险,以及地方融资平台债务解决过程中的政策选择等问题做了初步分析。结果表明:当财政政策因经济下行发力而产生融资需求时,地方政府可以通过地方融资平台打通从金融部门汲取资源的路径,从而产生实质上宽信用的效果,这可以在一定程度上熨平经济波动;尽管背靠政府信用的地方融资平台可以通过借新还旧的庞氏融资来维持流量平衡,但其庞氏融资能力并非一成不变,而是会随着债务的积累而逐渐减弱,一旦地方融资平台的庞氏融资能力下降超过一定程度,经济波动的潜在风险就会明显上升;当地方融资平台的庞氏融资能力较弱时,债务本金削减政策在降低存量债务时会影响金融稳定,而宏观审慎政策能提升金融稳定,二者组合使用可以达到同时改善金融稳定和地价稳定的效果,从而间接拓宽财政政策和房地产刺激政策的回旋余地;当地方融资平台的庞氏融资能力基本丧失时,一旦发生货币紧缩,会引发比较严重的金融不稳定,此时LTV政策的效果显著减弱,而盯住信贷的资本充足率政策可能是更好的政策选择。In recent years,the debt issue of local government financing platforms(LGFPs)has become a major concern of researchers.This issue has its complexities in operational mechanisms because of its interconnections with financial activities,fiscal problems and the real economy.Comprehending origins of LGFPs'debt,avoiding associated risks and finding ways to resolve debt predicament are crucial to the steady development of China's economy,particularly as the potential debt risks faced by local governments have progressively transformed into a metaphorical"grey rhino"in China's economic and financial system.Within this context,it has become a major practical challenge to understand mechanisms of LGFPs'formation and evolution and to prevent the undue accumulation of debt-related risks in LGFPs.To provide a systemic analysis for these issues,this paper conducts a policy simulation analysis by developing a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium(DSGE)model.The theoretical model in this paper reveals that fiscal policies,driven by counter-cyclical adjustments,prompt financing demands.Local governments can facilitate access to resources from the financial sector through LGFPs,thus affecting credit dynamics and partially mitigating economic fluctuations.This process relies on the Ponzi financing capability of LGFPs,which is supported by government credit,but this capacity gradually declines as debt accumulates.Once it drops to a certain level,the potential risk of economic fluctuations will increase significantly.When the Ponzi financing capacity of LGFPs is weak,the debt reduction policy reduces financial stability,while macro-prudential policy improves financial stability.The combination of these two policies produces an effect of simultaneously bolstering financial stability and land prices.When LGFPs lose its Ponzi financing capacity,monetary tightening can lead to financial instability and a dilution of the effect of the loan-tovalue ratio(LTV)policy,but a credit-based capital adequacy policy promotes financial stability t

关 键 词：地方政府债务 庞氏融资 债务治理 宏观政策 

分 类 号：F124[经济管理—世界经济]