认知科学中身体的争论及其实用主义和解  

The Debate on the Body in Cognitive Science and Its Pragmatic Reconciliation

作　　者：戴潘[1] DAI Pan(Institute of Philosophy,Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences,Shanghai,200025)

机构地区：[1]上海社会科学院哲学研究所,上海200025

出　　处：《自然辩证法通讯》2023年第11期37-43,共7页Journal of Dialectics of Nature

摘　　要：以4E为代表的新一代认知科学,尽管它们在反对第一代认知科学上结成同盟,但它们之间的内在张力往往被忽略。这种张力典型地表现在身体的作用上,由此展开了在“身体中心主义”和“延展功能主义”之间的争论。而实用主义的理论资源,特别是杜威的“情境”和“有机体-环境”概念则为上述争论提供了一个更为综合的解决方案,即发展出一种“生成的功能主义延展”。Although the new generation of cognitive science represented by 4E form an alliance against the first generation of cognitive science,the internal tension between them is often ignored.This tension is typically manifested in the function of the body,which leads to the debate over the relationship between“body centrism”and“extended functionalism”.The theoretical resources in pragmatism,especially Dewey’s concepts of“situation”and“organism-environment”,provide a more comprehensive solution to the above debate,that is,developing into a“enactive-functionalist extension”.

关 键 词：具身认知 延展认知 生成认知 实用主义 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]