双层股权结构下董事制度的实践困境与解决途径  

The Practical Dilemma and Solution of Director System under Dual-class Share Structure

作　　者：李小凡 LI Xiao-fan(Faculty of Law,Macao University of Science and Technology,Macao 999078,China)

机构地区：[1]澳门科技大学法学院,中国澳门999078

出　　处：《宝鸡文理学院学报（社会科学版）》2023年第5期72-77,共6页Journal of Baoji University of Arts and Sciences：Social Science Edition

基　　金：广东省教育厅普通高校认定类科研项目青年创新人才类项目(人文社科类):控制股东债权劣后清偿规则研究(项目编号:2022WQNCX092)。

摘　　要：双层股权结构下,公司创始人以“一股多权”获得公司的实际控制权,有效防止了公司发展中股权被稀释、管理权被剥夺的风险,但公司董事制度随之又面临实践困境,公司内部治理失灵的风险骤增。破解董事制度的困境是规范公司内部管理、引导双层股权结构公司正向发展的关键。一方面,应明确实际控制人选举董事时适用表决权回归原则,保障董事的独立性;另一方面,应厘清董事忠实义务、勤勉义务的内涵及责任承担方式,落实董事的信息披露义务。Under the dual-class share structure,the company founder obtains the actual control right of the company with“one share with multiple rights”,which effectively prevents the risk of equity dilution and management right deprivation in the development of the company.But the company director system is faced with practical difficulties,and the risk of internal governance failure increases sharply.Solving the dilemma of the director system is the key to standardize the company’s internal management and guide the positive development of dual-class share structure companies.On the one hand,it should be clear that the actual controller should apply the principle of voting right regression when electing directors,so as to protect the independence of directors.On the other hand,it is necessary to clarify the connotations and responsibilities of directors’obligations of loyalty and diligence,and implement their information disclosure obligations.

关 键 词：双层股权结构 实际控制人 信义义务 董事选举机制 

分 类 号：D922[政治法律—法学]