政府信息披露机制下绿色建筑消费者购买意愿演化博弈研究  

Evolutionary Game Study on the Consumers Purchase Intention of Green Building under the Mechanism of Government Information Disclosure

作　　者：刘光凤 谢扬 LIU Guangfeng;XIE Yang(School of Economics and Management,Chongqing Jiaotong University,Chongqing 400074,China)

机构地区：[1]重庆交通大学经济与管理学院,重庆400074

出　　处：《科技与经济》2023年第5期106-110,共5页Science & Technology and Economy

基　　金：重庆市教育科学规划青年课题--“重庆高校工程伦理教育的关键机制及对策研究”(项目编号:K22YY207694,项目负责人:刘光凤)成果之一。

摘　　要：从绿色建筑需求侧出发,运用前景理论与演化博弈理论构建政府信息披露机制下绿色建筑消费者购买意愿的演化博弈模型,分析政府信息披露政策下系统的演化稳定策略。结果表明,当政府建立信息披露平台的感知收益大于其支出、消费者购买绿色建筑的感知收益大于购买普通建筑的感知收益时,系统会演化至理想状态;政府建立信息披露平台的感知收益、绿色建筑信息对消费者感知收益的激励程度和惩罚政策对购买普通建筑消费者的惩罚强度,均与绿色建筑消费者的购买意愿正相关。因此,建议政府从降低管理信息披露平台成本、完善信息披露平台、加大惩罚力度等方面增强绿色建筑消费者的购买意愿。From the perspective of the demand side of green building,this paper uses the prospect theory and evolutionary game theory to build an evolutionary game model of consumers purchase intention of green building under the government information disclosure mechanism,and analyzes the evolutionary stability strategy of the system under the government information disclosure policy.The results show that the system will evolve to the ideal state when the perceived benefits of the government in establishing the information disclosure platform are greater than its expenditure,and the perceived benefits of the consumers in buying green buildings are greater than the perceived benefits of buying ordinary buildings.The perceived benefits of the government's information disclosure platform,the incentive degree of green building information to consumers perceived benefits,and the punishment intensity of restrictive policies to consumers who buy ordinary buildings are all positively correlated with the consumers purchase intention of green building.Therefore,it is suggested that the government should reduce the cost of managing information disclosure platform,improve information disclosure platform,and increase punishment to enhance the consumers purchase intention of green building.

关 键 词：绿色建筑 演化博弈 前景理论 感知收益 信息披露 

分 类 号：X322[环境科学与工程—环境工程] F426.9[经济管理—产业经济] F713.55