基于演化博弈的企业内部式众包模式激励策略研究  

Incentive Strategies for Enterprise Internal Crowdsourcing Models Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

作　　者：靖鲲鹏[1] 郏璐 JING Kunpeng;JIA Lu(School of Economics and Management,Yanshan University,Qinhuangdao 066004,Hebei Province,China)

机构地区：[1]燕山大学经济管理学院,河北省秦皇岛066004

出　　处：《昆明理工大学学报（自然科学版）》2023年第5期201-210,共10页Journal of Kunming University of Science and Technology(Natural Science)

基　　金：河北省软科学基金项目(21557619D)。

摘　　要：内部式众包可以在保护企业内部信息,维持企业竞争优势的基础上,更高效地汇集群体智慧,为企业带来群智创新.采取有效的措施促使企业与员工积极参与,是当前内部式众包面临的重要挑战.通过引入职业激励因素,探究企业与员工间的交互关系.构建演化博弈模型,分析博弈双方的稳定性策略与影响因素,并运用Matlab仿真分析不同参数变化对演化结果的影响.结果表明:演化结果受初始状态的影响,双方的初始状态越好,企业与员工的策略选择对激励参数的变化越敏感.提升职业激励正强化与负强化,降低评价成本与提升评价力度,降低员工的怠工效应,均可以有效提升企业与员工参与的积极性,使内部式众包进入良性循环.最后,为企业内部式众包管理提供了改进建议.Internal crowdsourcing can efficiently harness collective intelligence,bringing about crowd-driven innovation for enterprises while safeguarding internal information and maintaining a competitive edge.Encouraging active participation from both the enterprise and employees poses a significant challenge in current internal crowdsourcing endeavors.Exploring the interaction between enterprises and employees by introducing occupational incentive factors.By constructing an evolutionary game model,it analyzes the stability strategies and influencing factors of both sides in the game,and employs Matlab simulation to assess the impact of parameter variations on the evolutionary results.The results indicate that the evolutionary outcome is influenced by the initial conditions,and the better the initial conditions for both parties,the more sensitive their strategic choices are to changes in incentive parameters.Enhancing both positive and negative reinforcement in occupational incentives,reducing evaluation costs,increasing evaluation intensity,and mitigating employee shirking effects can effectively boost the enthusiasm of both enterprises and employees for participation,creating a positive feedback loop in internal crowdsourcing.Finally,this study provides recommendations for improving internal crowdsourcing management within enterprises.

关 键 词：内部式众包 演化博弈 职业激励 仿真分析 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F272.92