罗尔斯《正义论》视角下封闭公司股东压制的救济  

The Relief of Shareholders’Suppression in Closed Companies From the Perspective of Rawls’“Theory of Justice”

作　　者：史森尹 SHI Sen-yin(Shanghai Normal University,Shanghai 200234,China)

机构地区：[1]上海师范大学哲学与法政学院,上海200234

出　　处：《哈尔滨学院学报》2023年第10期57-61,共5页Journal of Harbin University

摘　　要：封闭公司中控股股东滥用资本多数决原则实施股东压制是公司治理的一种困境。通说采用利益衡量原则来保护中小股东从而实现公司正义,但其模糊性使得背后法理的不一致而出现同案不同判现象。罗尔斯《正义论》中的法哲学思想以及方法论与公司法原理中公司的本质和公司治理渊源有着逻辑上的高度契合,因而可借此统一裁判标准。在域外先进公司立法例缺少统一解释路径的前提下,《正义论》所提供的“社会基本善”在公司法领域转化为“股东基本善”,可以摆脱模糊的利益衡量方法而建立较明确的标准,为股东压制的救济提供新的思路。The abuse of the principle of majority capital by controlling shareholders in closed companies to suppress shareholders is a dilemma in corporate governance.It is generally said that the principle of balancing interests is used to protect small and medium-sized shareholders and achieve corporate justice,but its ambiguity leads to inconsistent legal principles and the phenomenon of different judgments in the same case.The legal philosophy and methodology in Rawls’“Theory of Justice”are logically highly consistent with the essence of companies and the origins of corporate governance in the principles of company law,thus allowing for the unification of judicial standards.In the absence of a unified interpretation path for advanced company legislation outside the region,the“basic social goodness”provided by the“Justice Theory”has been transformed into“basic shareholder goodness”in the field of company law,which can break away from vague methods of measuring interests and establish clearer standards,providing new ideas for the relief of shareholder oppression.

关 键 词：公司正义 股东压制 资本多数决 股东基本善 

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