基于拍卖价值理论的工程项目投标报价博弈研究  被引量:1

RESEARCH ON BIDDING GAME OF ENGINEERING PROJECTS BASED ON AUCTION VALUE THEORY

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作  者:曾维圣 郭志明 胡旭 罗丹 ZENG Wei-sheng;GUO Zhi-ming;HU Xu;LUO Dan(School of Civil Engineering and Architecture,Wuhan Institute of Technology,430074,Wuhan,China)

机构地区:[1]武汉工程大学土木工程与建筑学院,武汉430074

出  处:《建筑技术》2023年第20期2540-2545,共6页Architecture Technology

摘  要:由于信息的不对称,投标企业的报价呈现差异化现象。建设单位和投标企业的利益均与投标阶段的报价环节有关,如何制订科学合理的投标报价成为招投标市场的研究热门。在投标企业投标报价的研究中引入拍卖理论中的价值模型理论,基于博弈论中的博弈思想建立信息因素影响下的投标报价博弈模型,模型将信息因素量化为信息变化参数,通过信息变化参数分析投标企业的报价决策。研究结果显示,信息变化参数与投标企业的收益密切相关,有意识地收集私人信息和对关键信息予以保密是保护投标企业利益的有效措施。Due to the asymmetric information,the quotation of the bidding unit presents a differentiated phenomenon.The interests of the construction unit and the bidding unit are all related to the quotation link of the bidding stage.How to formulate a scientific and reasonable tender offer has become a hot research topic in the bidding market.The value model theory of auction theory was introduced into the study of bidding enterprises,and the game model of bidding price under the influence of information factors was established based on the game thought of game theory.The model quantified information factors into information change parameters,and analyzed bidding enterprises’decision making through the change of information change parameters.The results show that the information change parameters are closely related to the profits of the bidding enterprises.The conscious collection of private information and the confidentiality of key information are effective measures to protect the interests of the bidding enterprises.

关 键 词:信息不对称 拍卖理论 博弈论 信息变化参数 

分 类 号:TU723.2[建筑科学—建筑技术科学]

 

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