基于博弈DEA和Shapley值的航空碳减排效率研究  

Research on Carbon Emission Reduction Efficiency of Aviation Enterprises Based on Cooperative Game DEA and Shapley Values

作　　者：文军[1] 刘朱敏讷 WEN Jun;LIU Zhuminne(Airport College,Civil Aviation Flight University of China,Guanghan 618300)

机构地区：[1]中国民用航空飞行学院机场学院,广汉618300

出　　处：《舰船电子工程》2023年第8期170-175,共6页Ship Electronic Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(编号:61179074)资助。

摘　　要：为探究合作对效率的影响,在传统的网络DEA中加入合作博弈,建立合作前和合作后的效率评价模型,对该博弈的超可加性进行证明,并利用Shapley值分配效率收益,对我国31个省区市的航空企业碳排放效率系统进行实证分析。结果表明:1)航空企业与政府合作后的碳减排效率高于合作前的效率,且有效单元个数增加。2)政府和航空企业以碳减排投资额为基础进行合作,不仅能够提高碳减排效率,而且可以实现资金的合理利用。3)在一方利益未受损害时,以双方的贡献作为收益分配的依据,可使至少一方获得额外收益。In order to explore the impact of cooperation on efficiency,the cooperative game is added to the traditional network DEA,the efficiency evaluation model before and after cooperation is established,the super-additiveity of the game is proved,and the carbon emission efficiency system of aviation enterprises in 31 provinces,autonomous regions and municipalities in China is ana⁃lyzed empirically by using the Sharery value to distribute efficiency benefits.The results show that:1)The carbon emission reduc⁃tion efficiency of aviation enterprises and the government is higher than that of the pre-cooperation,and the number of effective units increases.2)Cooperation between the government and aviation companies based on the amount of carbon emission reduction investment can not only improve the efficiency of carbon emission reduction,but also achieve the rational use of funds.3)When the interests of one party are not harmed,the contribution of both parties as the basis for the distribution of benefits may enable at least one party to obtain additional benefits.

关 键 词：合作博弈 网络DEA 航空企业碳减排效率 SHAPLEY值 

分 类 号：V19[航空宇航科学与技术—人机与环境工程]