基于智猪博弈理论的央地政府生态治理研究  

Study on Ecological Management of Central and Local Governments Based on the Theory of Pigs’Payoffs

作　　者：关慕蓉 GUAN Murong(School of Public Administration,Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing 210000,China)

机构地区：[1]南京审计大学公共管理学院,南京210000

出　　处：《中国资源综合利用》2023年第10期114-116,共3页China Resources Comprehensive Utilization

摘　　要：中央政府与地方政府在生态环境治理、生态文明建设中发挥重要作用。双方存在利益博弈、政策博弈与权力博弈,形成经济学中的智猪博弈局面,制约生态文明的发展。央地政府的不同生态治理博弈策略也会产生不同的治理结果,要进一步探索央地政府生态治理的行为规制,推进政府生态治理能力与生态治理体系现代化,进一步推进国家生态文明建设。The central government and local governments play an important role in ecological environment management and ecological civilization construction.There is a game of interests,policies,and power between the two sides,forming the pigs’payoffs situation in economics,which restricts the development of ecological civilization.The different ecological management game strategies of the central and local governments can also produce different management results,it is necessary to further explore the behavioral regulations of ecological management between the central and local governments,promote the modernization of government ecological management capabilities and ecological management systems,and further promote the construction of national ecological civilization.

关 键 词：智猪博弈 央地政府 生态治理 

分 类 号：X321[环境科学与工程—环境工程] F124[经济管理—世界经济]