The Stability of Imitation Dynamics with Continuously Distributed Delays  

作　　者：FANG Caiya YANG Hui PI Jinxiu WU Wenjun 

机构地区：[1]School of Mathematics and Statistics,Guizhou University,Guizhou 550025,China [2]Guizhou Provincial Key Laboratory for Games,Decision Making and Control Systems,Guiyang 550025,China

出　　处：《Journal of Systems Science & Complexity》2023年第5期2067-2081,共15页系统科学与复杂性学报（英文版）

基　　金：supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.11271098;Guizhou Provincial Science and Technology Fund under Grant No.[2019]1067;the Fundamental Funds for Introduction of Talents of Guizhou University under Grant No.[2017]59。

摘　　要：This paper investigates imitation dynamics with continuously distributed delay.In realistic technological,economic,and social environments,individuals are involved in strategic interactions simultaneously while the influences of their decision-making may not be observable instantaneously.It shows that there exists a time delay effect.Different distributions of delay are further considered to efficiently lucubrate the stability of interior equilibrium in the imitation dynamics with continuous distributions of delay in the two-strategy game contexts.Precisely,when the delay follows the uniform distributions and Gamma distributions,the authors present that interior equilibrium can be asymptotically stable.Furthermore,when the probability density of the delay is general density,the authors also determine a sufficient condition for stability derived from the expected delay.Last but not least,the interested but uncomplicated Snowdrift game is utilized to demonstrate our theoretical results.

关 键 词：Continuous distributed delay evolutionary games imitation dynamics STABILITY 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]