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作 者:李新军[1] 刘春萌 曹永智[1] LI Xinjun;LIU Chunmeng;CAO Yongzhi(School of Economics and Management,Yantai University,Yantai 264005,China)
出 处:《工业工程》2023年第5期36-47,88,共13页Industrial Engineering Journal
基 金:国家社会科学基金重大资助项目(21&ZD102);山东省自然科学基金资助项目(ZR2020MG010,ZR2021MG023)。
摘 要:疫情、地震等突发事件频发,营业中断保险经常被作为转移风险的应急管理措施。以营业中断保险为主线,构建供应商优先购买保险和零售商跟随定价的双渠道供应链投保与定价优化决策模型,设计有效的收益共享契约进行协调,并拓展到供应商与零售商在线上直销与线下零售差异定价的情况。研究结果表明,参与营业中断保险,保险赔偿抵消了惩罚成本与缺货成本对价格的提高作用,供应商与零售商都倾向于降价促销以提高自身利润。供应商投保时,线上直销需求占比越大,保费率越小,供应商投保意愿越强烈;线下零售需求占比越大,购买保险对供应商的风险转移效果越弱,对零售商风险转移效果越强。交叉价格弹性较大时,零售商更偏好于差异定价。Due to the frequent occurrence of emergencies such as epidemics and earthquakes,business interruption insurance is often used as an emergency management measure to transfer risks.Based on business interruption insurance,a decision optimization model of insuring and pricing for dual-channel supply chains is built with suppliers buying insurance first and retailers following pricing.An effective revenue-sharing contract for coordination is designed,and extended to differential pricing between suppliers and retailers for online direct sales and offline retail.Results show that with business interruption insurance,the insurance compensation offsets the impact of penalty and shortage costs on price increases,so that both suppliers and retailers tend to reduce prices for promotion to improve their own profits.When the proportion of online demand is larger and the premium rate is smaller,the willingness of suppliers to insure is stronger;with the increase of the proportion of offline demand,the risk transfer effect of purchasing insurance on suppliers becomes weak,and the risk transfer effect on retailers becomes strong.When the cross-price elasticity is large,retailers prefer differential pricing.
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