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作 者:傅为忠[1] 陈佳佳 Fu Weizhong;Chen Jiajia(School of Management,Hefei University of Technology,Hefei 230041,China)
出 处:《科技管理研究》2023年第17期218-227,共10页Science and Technology Management Research
基 金:国家重点研发计划项目“再生砂粉全流程应用集成技术及全生命周期评价”(2020YFC1909900)。
摘 要:以回收企业和混凝土企业为研究主体,分析两者在市场调节机制和政府调节机制下协同创新的策略选择并进行数值仿真。研究结果表明:(1)混凝土企业的参与意愿是双方达成协同创新合作的关键,回收企业的参与意愿高于混凝土企业;(2)在两种机制下,双方选择积极参与策略的可能性与收益增长率和声誉收益呈正相关,与成本增长率和搭便车收益呈负相关;(3)在政府调节机制下,双方选择积极参与策略的可能性与成本补贴系数呈正相关,政府参与后会提高“搭便车”收益对系统演化影响的临界值,增加双方合作的可能性。Focusing on recycling enterprises and concrete manufacturers as the research subjects,this study delves into their collaborative innovation strategies under market and government regulatory mechanisms,supplemented by numerical simulations.The research findings reveal that:(1)The willingness of concrete enterprises to participate plays a pivotal role in fostering collaborative innovation between the two entities.Recycling enterprises exhibit a higher willingness to engage compared to concrete manufacturers.(2)Across both regulatory mechanisms,the likelihood of both parties opting for active participation strategies correlates positively with growth rates in benefits and reputation,while negatively correlating with cost escalation rates and free-rider benefits.(3)Under government regulatory mechanisms,the probability of both parties opting for active participation strategies positively correlates with cost subsidy coefficients.Government involvement elevates the critical threshold of the influence of free-rider benefits on system evolution,thereby increasing the probability of cooperative endeavors.
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