财政收入竞争、地方政府行为与要素资源扭曲  

Fiscal Revenue Competition, Local Government Behavior and Distortion of Factor Resources

作　　者：孔卫湘 刘宏俐 史杰 KONG Wei-xiang;LIU Hong-li;SHI Jie

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院 [2]对外经济贸易大学国际经济与贸易学院 [3]中国人民大学经济学院

出　　处：《科学决策》2023年第10期34-52,共19页Scientific Decision Making

摘　　要：本文构建了包含政府部门、工业部门、农业部门等多行为主体在内的理论模型,证明了地方政府在财政收入最大化动机下,会带来资本、劳动和土地三种资源配置的扭曲。在此基础上,选取2000-2017年中国248个地级市面板数据,实证检验了竞争性财政行为对上述三种要素资源扭曲的影响,研究发现:地方政府财政收入竞争显著提高了资本、劳动和土地三种资源的错配程度;在考虑官员更替、政治晋升、从政经历等政治因素的影响后,实证结果依然稳健;财政竞争导致的要素资源扭曲不仅存在于省内竞争上,在全国范围内同样广泛存在。异质性分析显示,东部地区地方政府财政竞争会引起劳动力资源扭曲,中西部地区地方政府竞争行为会引起资本和土地资源扭曲;2008年以前地方政府财政竞争主要引起资本扭曲,2008年以后则同时引发了资本扭曲和劳动力资源扭曲。研究结论表明,相对于政治激励,财政压力才是引发地方政府资源错配的根本原因。中央政府应当继续深化财税体制改革,逐步建立现代化的国家治理体系,科学、动态地评估官员任期内决策带来的中长期影响,有效降低地方政府财政竞争行为所带来的负面影响。This article constructs a theoretical model that includes multiple actors such as government departments,industrial departments,and agricultural departments,proving that local governments,under the motivation of maximizing fiscal revenue,will cause distortions in the allocation of capital,labor,and land resources.On this basis,panel data from 248 prefecture level cities in China from 2000 to 2017 were selected to empirically test the impact of competitive fiscal behavior on the distortion of the above three factor resources.The study found that competition in local government fiscal revenue significantly increases the degree of mismatch between capital,labor,and land resources;After considering the influence of political factors such as official turnover,political promotion,and political experience,the empirical results remain stable;The distortion of factor resources caused by fiscal competition not only exists in provincial competition,but also widely exists nationwide.Heterogeneity analysis shows that fiscal competition among local governments in the eastern region can cause distortions in labor resources,while competition among local governments in the central and western regions can cause distortions in capital and land resources;Before 2008,local government fiscal competition mainly caused capital distortion,while after 2008,it simultaneously caused capital distortion and labor resource distortion.The research conclusion indicates that compared to political incentives,fiscal pressure is the fundamental reason for the mismatch of local government resources.The central government should continue to deepen the reform of the financial and tax system,gradually establish a modern national governance system,scientifically and dynamically evaluate the medium to long-term impact of officials’decision-making during their tenure,and effectively reduce the negative impact of local government financial competition behavior.

关 键 词：财政收入竞争 地方政府行为 官员晋升 要素扭曲 资源错配 

分 类 号：F810.4[经济管理—财政学]