农地确权能够在农村信贷市场发挥“德·索托效应”吗?——兼论中国农地抵押之佯谬  

Can the Land Registration Play a“De Soto Effect”in Rural Credit Markets?——On the Paradox of China’s Farmland Mortgage

作　　者：尹鸿飞 YIN Hongfei

机构地区：[1]山东财经大学财政税务学院,山东济南250014

出　　处：《华中农业大学学报（社会科学版）》2023年第6期191-204,共14页Journal of Huazhong Agricultural University(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“乡村振兴战略背景下的中国农户信用评级:机制、效应与制度优化”(71873065);江苏省社会科学基金青年项目“江苏县域高质量发展水平测度与时空差异研究”(22EYC011)。

摘　　要：理论分析农地确权发挥德·索托效应的作用机理及其服务边界,同时兼论实践中的中国农地抵押之佯谬,以此综合评估确权后中国农地金融改革能否有效缓解农村信贷市场的融资约束难题,由此也延伸出对创新农村融资模式以满足农户融资需求的进一步讨论。分析表明,农地确权的德·索托效应在农村信贷市场尚不能完全发挥,其对融资约束的缓解作用在信贷需求端“有效”,而在信贷供给端“有限”,农户融资需求无法有效转化为实际供给。分析现阶段中国农地抵押的法律困境和委托代理问题发现,中国农地抵押改革在实践过程中存在佯谬,致使农地确权的德·索托效应在信贷供给端受限:一是外部环境尚未建立起服务于农地抵押的配套制度与措施,导致农地经营权无法成为金融机构认可的合格抵押品;二是农商行二元目标不一致及其与农户之间的信息不对称致使农地抵押贷款“失灵”。最后,建议加强农地金融改革的顶层设计,深化农地金融改革与缓解融资约束的有效对接;另外,可从抵押替代机制角度,探析缓解农村融资约束困境的创新模式。This paper theoretically analyzes the mechanism and service boundaries of the De Soto effect of the land registration,and discusses the paradox of China’s farmland mortgage in practice,so as to comprehensively evaluate whether China’s farmland financial reform can effectively alleviate the financing constraints of the rural credit market after the land registration,and thus the discussion is extended to innovating rural financing models to meet the financing needs of farmers.The analysis shows that the De Soto effect of the land registration cannot be fully exerted in the rural credit market,and its role in alleviating financing constraints is“effective”on the credit demand side,but“limited”on the credit supply side,and farmers’financing demand cannot be effectively translated into actual supply.The analysis of the legal predicament and principal-agent problems of China’s farmland mortgage at the present stage demonstrates that there are paradoxes in the practice of China’s farmland mortgage reform,which has limited the De Soto effect of the land registration on the credit supply side:First,the external environment has not yet established supporting systems and measures to serve the mortgage of farmland,resulting in the fact that farmland management rights cannot become qualified collateral recognized by financial institutions;second,the inconsistent dual objectives of rural commercial banks and the information asymmetry between them and farmers leads to the“failure”of agricultural land mortgage loans.Finally,it is recommended to strengthen the top-level design of farmland financial reform,and deepen the effective integration between farmland financial reform and alleviation of financing constraints.In addition,innovative models can be explored to alleviate the dilemma of rural financing constraints from the perspective of mortgage substitution mechanism.

关 键 词：农地确权 农地抵押 融资约束 德·索托效应 

分 类 号：F301[经济管理—产业经济]