“支持生命论”的自然法路径  

A Natural Law Approach to Pro-life Arguments

作　　者：杨天江[1,2] Yang Tianjiang(Administrative Law School,Southwest University of Political Science&Law,Chongqing 401120)

机构地区：[1]西南政法大学行政法学院,重庆401120 [2]西南政法大学法哲学编译研究中心,重庆401120

出　　处：《浙江社会科学》2023年第11期59-70,157,共13页Zhejiang Social Sciences

摘　　要：“支持生命论”和“支持选择论”是在美国具体司法事件中产生出来的对立观点,前者坚持胎儿生命权的价值所在,后者则强调对女性选择自由的保护。20世纪70年代以来,某种以亚里士多德—托马斯主义为思想资源的新自然法理论为“支持生命论”提供着核心论证,认为胎儿在发育过程中具有一种实质同一性,其作为一种生命机体在受孕时即具有道德地位,属于本质意义上的人的范畴。这种自然法论证反对功利主义和境遇论处理堕胎议题的方式,并与“支持选择论”展开了持久的理论竞争。Pro-life arguments and pro-choice arguments are two antagonistic arguments developed out of particular legal cases in the United States,with the former stressing the value of a fetus’s right to life and the latter emphasizing the safeguarding of women’s freedom of choice.Since the 1970s,certain type of New Natural Law Theory,inspired by Aristotelian-Thomistic thought,has been furnishing core arguments for the“Pro-life”stance.This type of theory maintains that a fetus possesses a substantial identity throughout its developmental trajectory,obtaining moral standing as a life organism from the moment of conception,and categorically falls within the essential definition of a person.This kind of natural law arguments opposes the treatments of abortion issues of Utilitarianism and Situationism,and engages in a sustained theoretical competition with pro-choice arguments.

关 键 词：支持生命论 支持选择论 堕胎议题 自然法 

分 类 号：D909.1[政治法律—法学理论]