风险态度多元化视角下工程供应链共创价值分配研究  

Study on co⁃creation value distribution in construction supply chain under pluralistic risk attitudes

作　　者：吴绍艳[1] 高缘 张新鑫 张励行 杜亚灵[1] Wu Shaoyan;Gao Yuan;Zhang Xinxin;Zhang Lixing;Du Yaling(Tianjin University of Technology,Tianjin 300382,China)

机构地区：[1]天津理工大学,天津300382

出　　处：《土木工程学报》2023年第11期184-194,共11页China Civil Engineering Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(72101179)。

摘　　要：传统的风险中性假设难以合理刻画总承包商在工程供应链共创价值分配中的委托、代理双重角色。为弥补这一研究差距,文章考虑总分包双方权力地位不对称的现状和多元化风险态度的假设,分别构建总包商-分包商“中性-中性”、“中性-规避”和“规避-规避”3种风险态度组合下的不对称纳什谈判模型,分析谈判能力、风险态度对最优收益分配系数和双方努力水平的交互影响。研究发现,3种风险态度组合下,谈判能力对总承包商努力水平的影响均存在“双刃剑”效应,特别是,“中性-规避”和“规避-规避”下,风险态度能够调节谈判能力对总承包商努力水平的影响;当总分包双方相对风险规避程度较低时,总包商过高的谈判能力将导致双方均降低努力投入,即导致“囚徒”困境的结果;降低分包商相对于总承包商的风险规避程度以及双方的位势差有利于克服总承包商的搭便车行为,促进双方完美履约。文章以期为有效设计激励方案、提升工程供应链共创价值提供可操作性建议。It is hard for traditional risk⁃neutral assumption to reasonably characterize the dual roles of general contractors in construction supply chain.To fill the gap,the asymmetric Nash bargaining models consisting of one general contractor(GC)and one subcontractor(SC)were developed based on the asymmetric power situation and the assumption on pluralistic risk attitudes.In this work,the interactive effects of bargaining power and risk attitude on optimal profit distribution coefficient and effort levels of both parties were investigated through the three established scenarios:“neutral⁃neutral”(both parties are risk⁃neutral),“neutral⁃averse”(GC is risk⁃neutral but SC is risk⁃averse),and“averse⁃averse”(both parties are risk⁃averse).The results show that bargaining power exerts double⁃edged sword effects on GC’s effort level for three scenarios.Interestingly,under“neutral⁃averse”and“averse⁃averse”scenarios,risk attitude moderates the influence of bargaining power on GC’s effort level.Moreover,when the relative risk aversion of both parties is sufficiently low,excessive bargaining power of GC may lead to a prisoner dilemma situation.It is shown that the free⁃ride behavior of GC may be mitigated by lowering the relative risk aversion between two parties and their power asymmetry.The useful insights are provided in this study to design effective incentive scheme and enhance co⁃creation value within construction supply chain.

关 键 词：工程供应链 价值分配 不对称纳什谈判 风险态度 

分 类 号：F284[经济管理—国民经济]