基于前景理论的绿色建筑认证推广政企演化博弈研究  

Research on Evolutionary Game Between Government and Enterprise in Promoting Green Building Certification Based on Prospect Theory

作　　者：国西林 苏义坤[1] 郑志哲 GUO Xilin;SU Yikun;ZHENG Zhizhe(College of Civil and Transportation Engineering,Northeast Forestry University,Harbin 150040,China)

机构地区：[1]东北林业大学土木与交通学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150040

出　　处：《工程管理学报》2023年第5期24-29,共6页Journal of Engineering Management

基　　金：国家重点研发计划项目(2021YFF0602002).

摘　　要：为探索合理促进房地产开发企业参与绿色建筑认证、推动绿色建筑发展,将前景理论与演化博弈结合,构建了地方政府与房地产开发企业之间的演化博弈模型,分析了演化稳定路径及关键参数对演化路径的影响,并通过数值仿真实验。结果表明,地方政府、房地产开发企业的决策行为会受到对方的决策影响;补贴、税收优惠等政策能够促进绿色建筑认证的推广,但补贴、税收优惠过低达不到预期效果;政府加大对企业坚持传统生产造成环境恶化的处罚也会推动绿色建筑认证的推广;政府公信力提升、企业竞争力加强也会提高实施绿色建筑认证的感知收益,有助于策略组合向理想状态演化。To explore the reasonable promotion of real estate development enterprises to participate in green building certification and promote green building development,combining prospect theory and evolutionary game,an evolutionary game model between the local government and real estate development enterprises is established.The evolutionary stability path and the influence of critical parameters on the evolutionary path are analyzed.The numerical simulation experiments are conducted.The results show that the decision-making behavior of local governments and real estate development enterprises will be affected by the other side's decision-making.Subsidies,tax incentives and other policies can promote the promotion of green building certification.However,too low subsidies and tax incentives cannot achieve the expected effects.The government will also promote the promotion of green building certification by increasing penalties for environmental degradation caused by enterprises sticking to traditional production.The improvement of government credibility and the strengthening of enterprise competitiveness will also improve the perceived benefits of the implementation of green building certification,which will help the strategy mix to evolve to an ideal state.

关 键 词：前景理论 绿色建筑认证 决策行为分析 演化博弈 

分 类 号：TU201.5[建筑科学—建筑设计及理论]