资本下乡背景下的村企合约选择:固定租约与分成合约  

Contract Choice for New Rural Collective Economic Organization and Enterprise in the Context of Capital Flowing to the Countryside:Anchor Lease and Sharecropping of Share Tenancy

作　　者：雷丽霞 张应良[2] LEI Lixia;ZHANG Yingliang(College of Economics and Management,Southwest University,Chongqing 400715,China;Rural Economy and Management Research Center,Southwest University,Chongqing 400715,China)

机构地区：[1]西南大学经济管理学院,重庆400715 [2]西南大学农村经济与管理研究中心,重庆400715

出　　处：《西南大学学报（社会科学版）》2023年第6期172-184,共13页Journal of Southwest University(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目“新形势下提升中国粮食产业战略竞争力的重点方略与路径选择研究”(20AGL023),项目负责人:张应良;重庆市社会科学规划项目“落后地区农村集体经营性资产股权化改革研究”(2017QNGL59),项目负责人:雷丽霞;中央高校基本科研业务费重点项目“工商资本下乡背景下非农业主与农户之间的权益冲突及其治理研究”(SWU1709262),项目负责人:李国珍

摘　　要：以工商企业为主体的资本力量在发展壮大新型农村集体经济的过程中发挥了重要作用,新型农村集体经济组织与外来企业合作有效的关键在于合约联结方式。基于“交易成本—合约选择”的分析思路,将村企双方缔约的交易成本定义为事前议价成本和事后监督、决策成本,分别构建了固定租约模型、分成合约模型。研究发现当确定一个固定租约的事前议价成本太高,使村企双方商定一个固定租约不可能的时候,村企会寻求用分成合约来代替。与未承包到户的荒山、荒坡等农村集体资产相比,承包到户的农地等农村集体资产更有可能采用固定租约。新型农村集体经济组织的人力资本专用性越强,集体资产属性越难以测度,村企越倾向于签订分成合约。通过三个典型案例对比分析,对理论假设进行了验证。进一步讨论发现若交易成本过高,将导致农村集体资产潜在的“反公地悲剧”问题;若合约不匹配,将导致村企共同的生产效率损失问题。The industrial and commercial enterprises with capital force plays an important role in the process of developing and expanding the new rural collective economy.The key to the effective cooperation between the new rural collective economic organization and enterprises lies in the types of contracts.Based on the analytic logic of“transaction costs-contract choice”,this paper defines the transaction costs of the contract choice for new rural collective economic organization and enterpriseas ex-ante negotiating costs,ex-post supervision costs and ex-post decision making costs.Subsequently,a theoretical model of anchor lease and sharecropping of share tenancyare constructed respectively.The study found that when the ex-ante negotiating cost is too high to make ananchor lease,new rural collective economic organization and enterprise will choosea sharecropping of share tenancy.Rural collective assets with contracted farmlands to households are more likely to conclude a sharecropping of share tenancy,compared with those with uncontractedbarren hills and slopes.The stronger the specificity of human capital in the new rural collective economic organization grows,the more difficult it is to measure the attributes of collective assets,and the more likely new rural collective economic organization and enterprises are to sign a sharecropping of share tenancy.Througha comparative analysis of three typical cases,the theoretical hypothesis is verified.Further discussion found that if the transaction cost is too high,it will lead to the potential“anti-commons tragedy”of rural collective assets;If the contract does not match,it will lead to loss in efficiency of joint production of new rural collectiveeconomic organization and enterprises.

关 键 词：交易成本 合约选择 固定租约 分成合约 

分 类 号：F301.21[经济管理—产业经济]