供应商融资中买方的最优担保策略  

The Buyer's Optimal Guarantee Policy for a Financially Constrained Supplier

作　　者：李沿海 赵玲 LI Yan-hai;ZHAO Ling(School of Economics and Management,Fuzhou University,Fuzhou 350116,China;Business School,Foshan University,Foshan 528000,China)

机构地区：[1]福州大学经济与管理学院,福建福州350116 [2]佛山科学技术学院经济管理学院,广东佛山528000

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2023年第10期12-19,共8页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71801111);福建省自然科学基金资助项目(2021J01572)。

摘　　要：在两级供应链中,零售商需要向供应商采购产品以满足随机的市场需求,供应商需要在市场需求观测到之前进行备货。供应商的自有资金是有限的,在必要时可向银行借款。在完全竞争的资本市场中,银行会根据贷款数量以及相应的风险决定其利率,使其期望回报率等于无风险利率。为了降低供应商的融资成本,促使其提高备货量,零售商有动机为供应商提供贷款担保。供应商和零售商进行Stackelberg博弈,首先由零售商决定采购价格和担保比例,然后由供应商决定备货量。供应商和零售商均为风险中性的决策者,以最大化自身期望利润为目标。研究结果表明:对给定的采购价格和担保比例,供应商的期望利润是其备货量的拟凹(quasi-concave)函数,其最优备货量是唯一的。零售商的最优策略是提供全额担保,零售商的最优期望利润是供应商自有资金的减函数。本文还讨论了存在破产成本的情形,发现破产成本不利于零售商,但不会改变零售商的最优担保策略。In a bilateral supply chain,the retailer sources product from the supplier to satisfy the random demand.The supplier needs to produce the product before the demand is realized.The supplier is financially constrained and can borrow money from the bank if necessary.As the capital market is perfectly competitive,the bank will determine the interest rate based on the loan amount and the associated risk so as to maintain its expected return rate equal to the exogenous risk-free rate.In order to reduce the financing cost of the supplier and induce him to produce more product,the retailer has a motivation to provide a(partial or full)guarantee for the supplier’s loan.A key feature of our model is that the guarantee is not a hard constraint of the loan amount,i.e.,the supplier can borrow as much as he needs,regardless of the retailer’s guarantee proportion.The retailer and supplier play a Stackelberg game.The retailer needs to decide the purchasing price and guarantee proportion as a leader,and then the supplier determines the production quantity as a follower.Both the retailer and supplier are risk-neutral profit maximizers.By backward induction,the supplier’s decision is studied,and then retailer’s problem is considered.For any given purchasing price and guarantee proportion,the supplier’s expected profit is quasi-concave in the production quantity,and thus his optimal-response production quantity is unique.The retailer’s optimal policy is to provide a full guarantee for the supplier’s loan.The retailer’s guarantee will not change he financing cost of the whole supply chain,but can shares the supplier’s financing cost.By providing a full guarantee,the retailer can maintain the supplier’s production quantity unchanged while offering a lower purchasing price.The overall effect of full guarantee is beneficial to the retailer.In other words,a full guarantee causes larger financial loss but brings higher sales profit to the retailer.The retailer’s optimal expected profit is demonstrated to be decreasin

关 键 词：资金约束 供应商融资 买方担保 有限担保比例 破产成本 

分 类 号：F252[经济管理—国民经济]