商超具有价格控制力的生鲜品供应链优化决策  

Optimal Decision of Fresh Produce Supply Chain with Price Control Power in Supermarkets

作　　者：张艳[1,4] 牟进进 王淑云 ZHANG Yan;MOU Jin-jin;WANG Shu-yun(School of Economics and Management,Yantai University,Yantai 264005,China;School of Management,Shandong Vocational University of Foreign Affairs,Weihai 264504,China;School of International Trade and Economics,Shandong University of Finance and Economics,Jinan 250014,China;School of Economics and Management,Hebei University of Technology,Tianjin 300401,China)

机构地区：[1]烟台大学经济管理学院,山东烟台264005 [2]山东外事职业大学管理学院,山东威海264504 [3]山东财经大学国际经贸学院,山东济南250014 [4]河北工业大学经济管理学院,天津300401

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2023年第10期266-275,共10页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助面上项目(72072154,71672166);山东省社会科学规划重点项目(22BGLJ06)。

摘　　要：针对大型商超和果蔬农业合作社组成的生鲜品二级供应链,将价格视为控制力的函数,需求同时受价格、保鲜努力和随机因素的共同影响,构建商超主导的分散决策模式与一体化决策模式博弈模型。分析表明,最优控制力水平是客观存在的,并且与控制力价格系数呈反向变动关系,商超可以通过自身声誉、口碑、服务等提升影响产品定价的能力,而不是仅靠争夺控制权大小;一体化决策的系统绩效水平高于分散决策,基于合作共赢的残值补贴机制可以很好地解决供应链双重边际效应问题,实现供应链各成员收益的帕累托改进。最后,通过算例验证了理论模型的有效性,并分析了控制力价格系数及消费者保鲜敏感系数对系统最优决策及绩效的影响。The fight for supply chain control powers has been a common problem between supply chain members,which makes supply chains unstable and leads to the loss of both parties'profits.The control power has a significant impact on product pricing,ordering quantity of the supply chain,and the cooperation performance of fresh product supply chain members.So,the allocation of supply chain control powers among different members is of great significance to the sustainability of the supply chain cooperation.Assuming that a two-level fresh product supply chain composed of one fresh product supplier and one large supermarket.The supermarket decides the selling price according to its own market positioning,consumer purchasing psychology and product market demand.At the same time,the supermarket will make certain freshness-keeping efforts to ensure the sales of fresh products.The supermarket has the supply chain control power which not only determines the selling price,but also controls the decision-making order.The selling price is regarded as a func⁃tion of control power,and the demand is affected by the price,freshness-keeping efforts and random variable.A game model under the decentralized and centralized is constructed to maximize profits.The optimal control power,fresh-keeping effort and order quantity are solved respectively by Stackelberg game and cooperative game.This study introduces the parameter of supply chain control power into fresh product supply chain models.Some computational studies are conducted to investigate the impacts of price coefficient of control power and sensitivity coefficient of freshness-keeping efforts on the profits of supplier,supermarket,and the overall supply chain under decentralized and centralized system,and the effect of the residual value subsidy on coordinated supply chain member’s expected profit.Some significant conclusions are obtained.Firstly,the optimal control power exists objectively,and has a reverse relationship with the coefficient of control power.Supermarkets should impro

关 键 词：保鲜努力 控制力 生鲜品 残值补贴 

分 类 号：C94[自然科学总论—系统科学]