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作 者:彭若弘[1] 田婷 PENG Ruohong;TIAN Ting(School of Economics and Management,Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications,Beijing 100876,China)
出 处:《北京邮电大学学报(社会科学版)》2023年第5期85-99,共15页Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Social Sciences Edition)
摘 要:使用2014—2020年深交所上市公司的样本数据,实证考察中小股东参与治理水平对企业金融化的影响。研究发现,中小股东积极参与公司治理会显著抑制企业金融化水平,这种效应在外部制度环境完善、内部控制水平高和股权制衡度高的企业样本中更为突出。影响机制检验表明,中小股东通过降低管理层代理成本、抑制大股东掏空行为和提升企业信息透明度实现对企业金融化的抑制作用。为完善中小股东内外部保护制度、拓宽其参与治理渠道、发挥其积极作用的相关政策制定提供了理论支持与经验证据。Sample data from companies listed on Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2014 to 2020 are used to empirically examine the impact of retail shareholders’participation in governance on corporate financialization.The research finds that active participation of retail shareholders in corporate governance significantly suppresses the level of corporate financialization.This effect is more prominent in samples with a more comprehensive external institutional environment,higher level of internal control,and high equity checks and balances.Mechanism tests show that retail shareholders realize the suppression of corporate financialization by reducing managerial agency costs,curbing major shareholders’tunneling behaviors,and enhancing corporate information transparency.This study provides theoretical support and empirical evidence for policy formulation on improving internal and external protection systems for retail shareholders,expanding their participation channels in governance,and playing their active roles.
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