电商平台需求信息不同获取方式下供应链均衡决策  

Supply Chain Equilibrium Strategy under Different Methods of Acquisition for E-commerce Platform Demand Information

作　　者：郭飞宇 朱临轩 陈兆波[1] GUO Feiyu;ZHU Linxuan;CHEN Zhaobo(School of Economics&Management,Taiyuan University of Science&Technology,Taiyuan 030024;People's Government of Shiye Town,Dantu District of Zhenjiang,Zhenjiang 212115,China)

机构地区：[1]太原科技大学经济与管理学院,山西太原030024 [2]镇江市丹徒区世业镇人民政府,江苏镇江212115

出　　处：《物流技术》2023年第9期61-65,131,共6页Logistics Technology

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(19GBL259);山西省基础研究计划资助项目(202103021223302)。

摘　　要：电商平台与小微供应商构成的供应链系统中,针对电商平台拥有的私人需求信息,研究电商平台公布、小微供应商预估与购买三种需求信息获取方式对供应链均衡决策与需求信息传递的影响。研究发现:当电商平台主动公布需求信息时,需求信息总会被夸大,这对供应商产生降低融资成本与增加破产风险两方面的影响。此时,供应商将不相信电商平台公布的需求信息,并采取自己预估市场需求信息的方式进行最优产量决策,导致真实需求信息无法在供应链中传递。为解决供应链成员之间市场需求信息无法传递的困境,为小微供应商设计了满足激励相容约束且与自有资金无关的信息购买机制。In this paper,in view of the supply chain system composed of an e-commerce platform and a small and micro supplier where the e-commerce platform owns private demand information,we studied the impact of three acquisition methods of demand information,namely release by e-commerce platform,estimation by small and micro supplier,and direct purchase,on the strategy of supply chain equilibrium and the transmission of demand information.The research found that the e-commerce platform would overstate the demand information when it actively published the information,which would impair the supplier's effort at reducing financing costs and increase its risk of bankruptcy.Thus,the supplier would not trust the demand information released by the e commerce platform,and instead rely on its own estimation of market demand information to make the optimal production decision.In this case,the authentic demand information cannot be passed down in the supply chain.To solve this problem,we designed for the small and micro supplier an information purchase mechanism satisfactory of the incentive compatibility constraint and irrelevant to its own funds.

关 键 词：电商平台 小微企业融资 信息不对称 信息获取方式 

分 类 号：F713.365.1[经济管理—产业经济] F274