复杂网络环境下不同政府补贴方式的企业数字化转型决策分析  

Decision analysis of enterprise digital upgrade with different government subsidies in complex network environment

作　　者：谢楠 何海涛 王宗润[4] XIE Nan;HE Haitao;WANG Zongrun(Business School,Hunan Normal University,Changsha 410081,China;Key Laboratory of Macroeconomics Big Data Mining and Application in Hunan Province,Hunan Normal University,Changsha 410081,China;Hunan Double Carbon Research Institute,Hunan Normal University,Changsha 410081,China;Business School,Central South University,Changsha 410083,China)

机构地区：[1]湖南师范大学商学院,长沙410081 [2]湖南师范大学宏观经济大数据挖掘与应用湖南省重点实验室,长沙410081 [3]湖南师范大学湖南省双碳研究院,长沙410081 [4]中南大学商学院,长沙410083

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2023年第8期2412-2427,共16页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71901094);国家自然科学基金重大项目(72091515);湖南省自然科学基金青年项目(2020JJ5378);湖南省研究生科研创新项目(CX20220467);湖南省普通高校青年骨干教师(2022)。

摘　　要：发展数字经济是把握新一轮科技革命和产业变革新机遇的战略选择.为加速数字经济发展,各国竞相制定激励政策引导数字技术与企业决策、社会治理等方面的深度融合.在此背景下,本文构建了不同政府补贴方式下消费者和企业两个群体间的Stackelberg博弈模型,并将该模型引入网络演化动力学博弈分析框架,从财权和事权的视角探讨了央地两级政府在数字市场机制下补贴策略的调整过程.结果表明:消费者数字产品偏好对数字产品需求量、数字技术水平和社会总福利的提高均具有显著的正向影响.此外,当消费者数字产品偏好较低时,中央政府可通过调整补贴方式来权衡“高数字技术水平”和“高社会福利”两目标的选择.相较于地方政府统一财权、事权的制度,财权收归中央和事权下放地方的制度不仅能提高企业合作研发数字技术的比例,降低研发投入成本和提高社会总福利,还能使中央政府通过财权手段抑制地方政府“内卷式”竞争行为.Developing digital economy is a strategic choice to grasp the new opportunities of scientific and technological revolution and industrial transformation in a new round.In order to accelerate the development of digital economy,countries are competing to formulate incentive policies to guide the deep integration of digital technology with enterprise decision-making and social governance.Under this background,this study constructs the Stackelberg game model between consumers and enterprises under different government subsidy modes,and introduces this model into the game analysis framework of network evolutionary dynamics.From the perspective of financial power and administrative power,this study discusses the adjustment process of central and local government’s subsidy strategy under the digital market mechanism,and carries out the numerical simulation and simulation analysis on the game model.The results show that consumers prefer to digital products has a significant positive impact on the demand for digital products,the level of digital technology and the improvement of social welfare.In addition,when consumers’preference for digital products is low,the central government can balance the choice of“high digital technology level”or“high social welfare”by adjusting the subsidy mode.Compared with the local governments unifying their financial and administrative powers,the centralization of financial power to the central government and the decentralization of administrative power to the local governments can not only increase the proportion of enterprises cooperating in research and development of digital technology,reduce the cost of research and development investment and improve the general welfare of the society,but also the central government can suppress the“involution”competition of the local governments through financial power.

关 键 词：数字经济 数字技术扩散 复杂网络 演化博弈 

分 类 号：C94[自然科学总论—系统科学] F282