“内部提示”与推断的自我知识  

“Internal Prompting”and Self-knowledge of Inference

作　　者：连帅 LIAN Shuai(School of Philosophy,Fudan University,Shanghai 200433,China)

机构地区：[1]复旦大学哲学学院,上海200433

出　　处：《东北大学学报（社会科学版）》2023年第6期8-14,共7页Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science)

摘　　要：关于心理状态的自我知识经常被认为是直接获得的,但在推断主义者看来,获得自我知识的方式通常是间接的,即基于证据的推断,其中的证据包含了被称为“内部提示”的经验片段。推断解释面临来自直接性理论的批评,但它们其实未能对推断解释造成严重威胁。推断解释在面对并非由显式推断获得的自我知识时未加阐释地假定了“无意识推断”,这使得推断解释对那些自我知识的适用性存疑,进而危及其一般性。由于“无意识推断”中的推断不同于显式推断,推断解释的一般性依赖于对“推断”概念的多元论理解。Self-knowledge of mental states is often thought to be achieved directly.However,in the view of inferentialists,the way to achieve self-knowledge is normally indirect,namely,through inference based on evidence,and the evidence for self-ascriptions involves certain experiential episodes called“internal promptings”.The inferential account faces the criticisms from directness theories,while in fact they fail to cause serious damage to it.When dealing with the self-knowledge which is not obtained through explicit inferences,the inferential account presupposes“unconscious inference”without further clarification,jeopardizing its applicability to self-knowledge through non-explicit inferences and thus their generality.Since“unconscious inference”is different from explicit inference in the form of inference,the generality of inferential account depends on a pluralist understanding of“inference”.

关 键 词：自我知识 内部提示 证据 无意识推断 多元论 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]