智能合约中理性经济人的道德风险及监管变革——以契约理念的嬗变为视角  被引量:3

On the Moral Hazard of Rational Economic Man in Smart Contracts and Its Regulatory Change from the Perspective of Transmutation of the Concept of Contract

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作  者:郎平 Lang Ping(Law school of Hebei University,Baoding 071002,Hebei,China)

机构地区:[1]河北大学法学院,河北保定071002

出  处:《征信》2023年第10期18-28,共11页Credit Reference

基  金:国家社会科学基金重大项目(22&ZD203)。

摘  要:纵观契约发展史,从社会契约到智能合约,前者的契约理念凸显从自由转向正义的演进历程,后者则以信用共识为核心,呈现出“中心化→去中心化→中心化与去中心化”的蜕变路径。随着智能合约的日臻完善,显现出智能合约重构社会契约的发展势头,这将给以契约为本质的金融体系带来“颠覆式”变革。审视金融体系的变革现状,百密一疏中疏忽了理性经济人的道德风险。鉴于此,深入研析区块链智能合约中理性经济人的道德风险及现有的“穿透式”监管措施,建议监管机构适用旅行规则、创制智能合约“范本”、采取“一揽子”客观穿透来补足监管“短板”,以此规制区块链智能合约中异化的道德风险。Throughout the history of contract development,from social contract to smart contract,the contract concept of the former highlights the evolution from freedom to justice,while the latter is centered on credit consensus,showing the transmutation path of“centralization→decentralization→centralization and decentralization”.With the improvement of smart contracts,the development momentum of smart contracts to reconstruct the social contract has appeared,which will bring“subversive”changes to the financial system with the contract as the essence.After revisiting the changes of the financial system,it is found that the financial system,though meticulously constructed,has neglected the moral hazard of rational economic man.In view of this,after analyzing the moral hazard of rational economic man in blockchain smart contracts and the existing“penetrating”regulatory measures,it is suggested that regulators should apply travel rules,create a“model”smart contract,and adopt a“package”of“objective penetration”to strengthen regulatory weakness,so as to regulate the alienation of moral hazard in blockchain smart contracts.

关 键 词:社会契约 智能合约 金融体系 道德风险 “穿透式”监管 

分 类 号:F832[经济管理—金融学] TP311[自动化与计算机技术—计算机软件与理论]

 

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