有效激励还是激励扭曲:员工持股计划对股价崩盘风险的影响  

Balancing Incentives:Effect of Employee Stock Ownership Plans on Stock Price Crashes Risks

作　　者：王德宏 孙亚婕 WANG Dehong;SUN Yajie(International Business School,Beijing Foreign Studies University,Beijing 100089,China)

机构地区：[1]北京外国语大学国际商学院

出　　处：《金融评论》2023年第5期77-102,126,共27页Chinese Review of Financial Studies

基　　金：北京外国语大学“双一流”重大(点)标志性项目研究成果《后疫情时期全球化风险研究:金融安全与商务风险视角》(项目编号:2022SYLZD001)的支持。

摘　　要：本文以2014~2020年中国沪深A股上市公司为样本,探究员工持股计划对股价崩盘风险的影响,发现(1)员工持股计划的实施增大了股价崩盘风险;(2)员工持股计划主要通过大股东侵占机制、管理层自利机制以及信息披露质量机制来影响股价崩盘风险;(3)员工持股计划中高管认购比例越高,公司股价崩盘风险越大;(4)异质性分析表明,当大股东不具有相对控股权并且公司未面临外部收购风险时,员工持股计划使股价崩盘风险增加的效果更加显著。本文集中探讨了2014年《指导意见》出台后,上市公司重新推行的员工持股计划的实施效果,拓展了员工持股计划的经济后果,揭示了员工持股计划实施过程中大股东侵占及管理层自利行为抑制了其积极作用的发挥并产生的严重激励扭曲问题。本文对推动员工持股计划良性发展以及完善员工持股计划制度设计具有一定的参考意义。This study examines the impact of Employee Stock Ownership Plans( ESOP) on stock price crash risks in light of the issuance of “Guidance on Pilot Implementation of ESOP”in 2014.Contrary to some existing research,our findings reveal that the implementation of ESOP is associated with an increased risk of stock price crashes.We identify three primary mechanisms through which ESOP contributes to this risk:major shareholder embezzlement,management selfinterest,and information disclosure quality.Furthermore,a higher subscription proportion of management in ESOP correlates with elevated stock price crash risk.This effect is particularly pronounced in firms where major shareholders lack controlling power and are not exposed to takeover risk.The insights presented hold relevance for advancing the constructive development of ESOP and refining its design.

关 键 词：员工持股计划 股价崩盘风险 管理层自利 大股东侵占 激励扭曲 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F272.92