我国市级地方政府间的税收竞争形式研究  

On the Tax Competition Forms among Local Governments at the Municipal Level in China

作　　者：胡洪曙[1] 吴纤媚 Hu Hongshu;Wu Xianmei(School of Public Finance and Taxation,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan 430073)

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学财政税务学院,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《华中师范大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2023年第6期74-93,共20页Journal of Central China Normal University:Humanities and Social Sciences

基　　金：中南财经政法大学部部省共建项目“转移支付对地方税收努力的影响研究”(31713110902)。

摘　　要：本文通过构建完全信息动态博弈模型来求解经济发展水平相同和不同情形下地区间税收竞争的子博弈精炼纳什均衡,同时使用2005-2021年282个市的面板数据,从总税收实际税负、增值税实际税负和企业所得税实际税负三个角度出发,采用准最大似然估计方法对税收竞争反应函数进行估计,分别从理论和实证的维度研究我国地方政府间的税收竞争形式。研究发现,相对经济发展水平的不同决定了地方政府参与税收竞争的优势策略差异;在实证分析中控制了共同冲击产生的异质性影响和本地税收政策对空间关联地区实际税负变化的滞后性反应时,不同税种的税收竞争形式存在显著差异。具体而言,经济发展水平相同或相近地区之间的税收竞争博弈产生的精炼均衡结果为趋同化税收竞争形式,经济发展水平差异越大,则越可能呈现出差异化税收竞争形式;总税收和增值税的税收竞争反应系数符号为负,表明总税收实际税负和增值税实际税负在地区间存在负相关关系,呈差异化税收竞争形式,而企业所得税竞争反应系数为正,表明地区间企业所得税实际税负存在正相关关系,呈趋同化税收竞争形式。By employing both theoretical analysis and empirical estimation,this paper examines tax competition among local governments in China,with a specific focus on whether it demonstrates convergent or differentiated characteristics.Firstly,we employ a Complete Information Dynamic Game Model to derive the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in tax competition scenarios for regions with varying levels of economic development.Then,using panel data of 282 regions during the period from 2005 to 2021 and considering overall tax burden,value-added tax burden,and corporate income tax burden,we empirically estimate tax reaction functions through the Quasi-Maximum Likelihood estimation method.Our theoretical analysis finds that relative disparities in economic development play a crucial role in shaping strategic behavior among local governments engaged in tax competition.Specifically,refined equilibrium outcomes of tax competition games between regions with similar or comparable levels of economic development indicate convergent competition,while regions characterized by greater disparities in economic development tend to exhibit a form of differentiated tax competition.Moreover,we carefully address the issues related to the heterogeneous impact of common shocks and the lagged reaction of local tax policies to spatially related regions,revealing significant differences in tax competition forms across different tax categories.More specifically,the reaction coefficients for total tax and value-added tax are negative,suggesting a negative correlation between overall tax burden and value-added tax burden across regions,indicating a differentiating form of tax competition.On the other hand,the reaction coefficient for corporate income tax is positive,indicating a positive correlation between corporate income tax burden among regions,indicating a convergence form of tax competition.

关 键 词：地方政府间税收竞争 地方政府间博弈 税收竞争反应函数 空间计量模型 

分 类 号：F812.42[经济管理—财政学]