委托代理框架下国有资本经营管理增效研究  

Research on Improving Efficiency of State-Owned Capital Management under Principal-Agent Framework

作　　者：魏益华[1] 周雯 WEI Yi-hua;ZHOU Wen

机构地区：[1]吉林大学经济学院,长春130012

出　　处：《吉林大学社会科学学报》2023年第6期87-104,232,共19页Jilin University Journal Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目(23YJCZH243)。

摘　　要：新时代以来,我国以管资本为主健全国有资产管理体制。基于对国有资本委托代理的内涵解读,通过构建数理模型和博弈模型,从静态和动态两方面对国有资本委托代理经营活动进行刻画,可得出系列推论,从而为国有资本增效经营相关政策措施提供理论支撑和研究路径。运用双重差分模型对新时代国有资产管理体制改革的政策效果进行实证,可为理论模型分析所得的系列推论提供佐证,同时为深化改革提供指引。以管资本为主完善国有资产监管,改组组建国有资本投资、运营公司,可有效提升国有资本经营效益,代理成本的降低在其中起到中介作用。出资人需依据国有资本的双重诉求设定差异化的目标和定位。外生冲击与不完美信息降低国有资本经营效率。有效的薪酬激励制度是实现博弈最优均衡的前提。委托授权的策略选择应基于净收益增加值与代理成本的测度与比较。Under the background of improving the state-owned assets management system with capital management as the main focus in the new era,a series of inferences can be drawn by constructing mathematical models and game models to describe the operation activities of state-owned capital principal-agent from static and dynamic aspects based on the connotation interpretation of state-owned assets principal-agent and state-owned capital principal-agent.There⁃fore,we can provide the theoretical support and research path for the relevant policies and measures of the state-owned capital efficiency management.The use of difference-in-differences model to demonstrate the policy effect of the stateowned assets management system reform in the new era can provide evidence for the series of inferences obtained from the analysis of the theoretical model and provide guidance for deepening the reform.Improving the supervision of stateowned assets based on capital management,reorganizing and establishing state-owned capital investment and operation companies can effectively improve the operating efficiency of state-owned capital.The reduction of agency costs plays an intermediary role.Investors need to set differentiated goals and positioning according to the dual demands of state-owned capital.Exogenous impact and imperfect information reduce the efficiency of state-owned capital operation.The effective compensation incentive system is the premise to realize the game optimal equilibrium.The strategy selection of authoriza⁃tion should be based on the measurement and comparison of net income increment and agency cost.

关 键 词：委托代理 国有资本 国有资产管理体制 代理成本 

分 类 号：F123.7[经济管理—世界经济]